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CHAPrKR I. 
New England Opposition to the War of 1812 
The unrelenting efforts of the New England states to prevent 
..... 
the national government from entering into a war against England in 
1812, and their determined efforts to secure peace once the war had. be-
PIl, culminated. in the Hartford Convention ... This celebrated convention, 
though rendered ineffectual by the TreatT or Ghent, had an outcome total-
lT unexpected bT it. Federalist constituents, which turned the rest of 
the count17 against the t treasonable t lathering and resulted in the 111-
timate down.tall of the Federalist partT_ 
The reasons for the declaration of war primarily &trected the 
New England states, and theT resented the administration which insisted 
upon avenging their interests against their will, starting its punishment 
or England by an embargo that throttled. the commerce of the eastern states 
.. 
and exposed their people to extreme privation. The administration further 
alienated the New England states bT favoring the French government against 
the English, and of the two countries the New En&1anders distinctlT con-
sidered. France the more ofrensive to their commerce. The Berlin and Milan 
Decrees of Napoleon, proaulgated in December, 1806, had declared Britain 
to be in a state or blockade, and in August, 1807, it was announced'that 
the vessels of neutral ~erica would be seized for violations. This, 
coupled with the French restrictions on trade with her col.nies, was more 
1 
2 
.bn.xi ... s t. the New Englan.ers than the British blockades, apr.ssments, 
or Orders in Council, since the British restrictions still left loopholes 
for some fairly lucratiYe trade. Thus, whUe Jefferson and Kadison smiled 
at France and frowned at England, the northern commercial· grOllpS shoutect 
their disapproYal, becomini more and more 9dfsgusted with a lovernment which 
claimed to be protecting their interests, while its everT act frustrate. 
them further. 
The question of British impressment of American saUors loomed 
large in the e18s of Jefferson and lladison. When England become inYolYed 
in war with France, her sailors in foreicn empl07 were ordered home to 
serve on British men-of-war. Many of these were reluctant to obey, as they 
plainly preferred the well-paid American service rather than the poorly-
paid, semi-slavery under British command. The very similarity in the lan-
cua,e and dress of the two nations immediately opened the way to much mis-
understandinc, since English nationals relied on the likeness to support 
. . .. 
their claims that they were American citizens. Naturally, abuses resulted, 
intentional and unintentional, when American shipping, stopped by British 
men-of-war, was stripped of its 'British SUbjects', including violently 
protesting American sailors. But impressment had no terrors for NewEng-
landers, in comparison to a war against Britain; John Lowell voiced the 
northern viewpoint: 
The northern and middle states, who are now united in opin-
ion, possess 3,000,000 of inhabitants, considerably more than 
did the whole UDited states at the time of the Declaration of 
Independence. -- They are a body of freemen, distinguished for 
their industry and virtue. They are the aTmers of nearly two 
third parts of all the tonnage of the United states, and fur-
nishes, probably three fourths of all the native seamen. They 
3 
are totally opposed t. a war for the privilege of pro~cting 
British seamen against their own sovereign. They know, from 
their own experience, that this subject of impressment is a mere 
instrument, wielded by men who are utterly indifferent about the 
suffering of the sailors or the merchants.l . 
The affair of the Leoparg and the ChesapeakA brought the matter 
.f impressment to a head in the United S~t:s. On June 22, 1807, the com-
mander of the British line-of-battle ship Leopard stopped the American 
frigate Chesapeake, and demanded the persons.of certain British deserters 
whom they claimed were on board. When the commander of the Chesapeake 
refused to comply, the British ship opened fire, and forcibly removed one 
British subject as weU as three Americans. When the news of this incident 
reached the states, Federalists and Republicans alike were ready for war 
to avenge the dishonor done the American flag. The Ess«x Junto, wishing 
to embarrass Jefferson in his seeming desire for hostilities, were the only 
group which was inclined to condone the act, defending the British point of 
view; the majority of the Federalists, however, including such prominent ,.. 
members as John '-tuincy Adams and Harrison Gray Otis, broke away from the 
Junto and joined the popular clamor against the outrage, more interested in 
revenge than in causing the war-party discomfiture. Jefferson lost his 
chance to declare war at this point when the country was united against the 
British, and in the course of his hesitation the issue lost its importance. 
Morison, in his Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, considers Jeffer-
son's lack of decision a definite mistake in view of subsequent events: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. A New England Farmer, (Jehn LoweU), Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr. 
Madison, Boston, 1812, 5. 
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Looking back on 1807 from a period of Hague confepences and 
arbitration treaties, Jefferson's moderation and restraint at that 
trying period seems most commendable. But the sequel proved that 
none of his expedients could prevent a war, which might far better 
have come in 1807, with the entire natien up in arms over the in-
sult to its flag, than in 1812, atter one section of the Union had 
been led by four years of commercial restriction into an attitude 
of violent disaffection.l " . < 
.,. .... 
On July 2, 1807, Jefferson retaliated by closing the American 
ports to British men-of-war, which resulted in a begrudging apology from 
Great Britain, and an offer of reparation on~erms which left the United 
States no alternative but to refuse. By this time the New England states 
were unconcerned over the impressment and irritated over the closure of 
ports; the rest of the coast, however, lost none of its ardor. On Aucust 3, 
1807, John Rutledge of Charleston wrote to Otis in Massachusetts, 
Iou are so cool & dispassionate a people in Boston that yo~ 
seem to have escaped the passion which enflames .s, in consequence 
of the outrage on one of our frigates. Altho' I deprecate war 
quite as much as any of my friends can, yet, I think, a liar (even 
with Great Britain) would prove more honourable prosper.~s & sate, 
& less costly, than a state of Peace in which a foreign Nation is 
t. exercise the right of searching our National Ships. The gentr-
al business of impressing American seamen was to be sure not wort 
mooting -- where G. Britain has in her service one of our sailors 
we have twenty of hers on board our Jierchantmen, & this is so well 
known in that section of the Union where Mariner a & navigation be-
leng (New England) that cellmplaints bave ceased. The complainings 
come from Virginia, where there are neither sailors nor ship, & 
where this is contrived to aliment & concentrate the angry pas-
sions fioating through our COlUltry agaimst G. Britain, Altho' 
this disgraceful Spirit had brought upon U8 our present deplorabl 
condition, & this miserable state is chargeable to the Errors & 
Vices of those impirics who administer our government, sttll ., 
friend. we must support this government. With our Ce.mmerce so ex-
tend.ed as it is, & our Keels frettin& every sea, we must have a 
naVT; & that will be impossible if our Ships of War are to be 
searched -- we must kick against this & fight against it, & fight 
as we should pro Aris & focis •••• 2 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. SBJIlL'lel Eliot Morison, Life !Dd Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 
1765-1848, I, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1913, 276. 
2 Ibid., "John Rutledge to otis, Charleston, August 3d, 1807", 284. 
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Great Britain answered the American closure of ports b~. tightening 
the restrictions contained in the Orders in Council. The first Orders, 
issued in January, 1807, had forbidden neutrals to maintain coastwise com-
merce between French or allied ports; the second Orders, issued the follow-
ing December, forbade all direct trade betw~n the United States and contin-
ental Europe, unless the cargoes were first landed in Britain and duty paid. 
To add insult to injury came word of the proclamation of October, 1807, 
.. 
which gave full indorsement of impressment. Embargo seemed to Jefferson 
the only fitting retaliation short of war. 
The Embargo, which went into effect in December, 1807, was an ex-
tremely unpopular, as well as futile, gesture. Its main effect was practi-
cally to exterminate the American merchant marine, which was forbidden to 
carryon any foreign commerce whatsoever, and its coastwise trade was like-
wise hampered by "burdensome restrictions". Its avowed purpose was to pro-
tect American shipping from capture and at the same time force France and 
... 
England to meet the terms of the United States by depriving them of American 
produce; in both instances it failed completely. While ships were protected 
commerce was ruined, and France and England merely looked elsewhere for 
their markets. Added to this was discontent of the people affected, for 
the sudden removal of their source of income [alleviated only a little by 
smuggling1 resulted in producing conditions of extreme poverty in t~e coast-
al towns. New England could hardly be expected to react kindly to the 
government which was allowing it to starve because of a measure which carr-
ied with it only disadvantage. It 1829 otis wrote, 
To the embargo imposed in December, 1807, nearly all the 
delegation of Massachusetts was opposed. The pretexts for impos-
6 
ing it were deemed by her citizens a mockery of her sufferings. 
Owning nearly one-third of the tonnage in the United States, she 
felt that her voice ought to be heard in what related to its se-
.curity. Depending principally on her foreign trade and fisheries 
for support, her situation appeared desperate under the operation 
of this law, in its terms perpetual. It was a bitter aggravation 
of her sufferings to be told that its object was to preserve thes 
interests.l .. < 
.. .." 
John Howe, a British spy, scathingly disposed of Jefferson's embargo in the 
following letter home: 
This countl"T [AaericaJ has lo!g both rulers and people enter 
tained an idea, that Great Britain and her Colonies, particularly 
her viest India Colonies, could not do without them. And 80 fully 
was Mr. Jefferson possessed with that idea, that he conceived his 
foolish embargo measure, would inflict such an injury on us, as 
would soon compel our uovernment, to give up the order relative 
to seamen, the respective orders, founded on the Milan decree to 
punish without enquiry any of our Officers whose conduct the~ saw 
fit to call in question, and in short that it would compel the 
nation to relinguish its sovereignty on the Sea, and to become as 
contemptible as they would delight in rendering her. In this ex-
pectation, and to cooperate as far as they dared with Bonaparte, 
in his attempts to destroy the commerce of England this Embargo 
was laid •••• But every mischief Mr. Jefferson calculated, as it 
respected Great Britain, has been averted, and the whole pressure 
of this. mighty evil is every day operating with increased effect 
on this devoted Country, and will each day bring its effects .~ 
closer home to him and his coadjutors •••• 
They appear much mortified here, when I tell them, that we 
consider the Embargo a great blessing in Nova Scotia, and that we 
think the Bill should have been entitled "An Act for the better 
encouragement of the British Colonies in A.merica".2 
It was at this point that John -ruincy Adams alienated himself fro 
the Federalist party by declaring his approval ot the embargo. As a conse-
quence, Massachusetts in the elections of June, 1808, refused to support h' 
1 Henry Adams, Documents Relst· to New En and Federalism, 1800-1815, 
"An Appeal to the itizens of the nited ~tstes, by rrison Gray otis; 
Little, Hrown, and Company, Boston, 1877, 79. 
2 American Historical Review, XVII, "Report ot John Howe, II 1a4acllillan Com-
pany, New York, 1912, 89-90. 
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for re8lection to the Senate, and Adams retaliated by resigning when the 
Massachusetts Legislature approved the anti-embargo resolutions. It was 
the opinion of John ~uincy Adams, however, which influenced Jefferson to 
repeal the embargo, since Adams had expressed the opinion that its con-
tinuance would be met with "forcible resis~~ce" and possibly by civil war. 
Gore describes the rebellion brewing in Boston as a result of the 
embargo in a letter to Rufus King of New York, 
• The people of our Country are suffering extremely and must 
soon be reduced to absolute wretchedness; I mean that portion of 
them, who have hitherto subsisted by navigation, & especially by 
the fisheries. They are obliged to depend on charity for food 
and fuel. In Beverley & Marblehead this is manifestly the case. 
In the latter 2000 dollars has been borrowed by the Town to re-
lieve the necessities. In the former, private contributions have 
become very heavy: one Gentleman told me he had already given 
to men, heads of families, more than 50 cords of wood in quanti-
ties of 2x4 feet •••• This same person said many others in that 
Town had already given away much greater quantities in proportion 
to their means. In Cape Ann they have continued to send their 
fish to market. In Portland, they have in several instances, set 
the Officers of Customs at defiance & sent their vessels to sea. 
Kilitary companies are now marching Eastward, it is said, for 
Salem & Marblehead for the purpose of preventing violations of .~ 
the Embargo, or, in the words of the Resolutions, to put the 
Country in a state of Defense. Genl. strong, who has been here, 
thinks the people will BOon require the influence of good men to 
liepress or guide their zeal in opposition to the National Govern-
ment.2 
But the actual repeal of the embargo and the substitution of a non-inter-
course act toward ~ritain, in no way decreased the bitterness of the New 
Englanders toward the national government. Its ill-effects could not be 
1 Adams' charges are more fully discussed in Chapter III. 
2 Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, V, ed. Gharles R. King, "C. Gore 
to R. Aing, December 8, 1808", G.P. Putnam's Sons, ~ew York, 1898, 110-111. 
; 
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overcome immediately, as this excerpt from a contemporary sermon 4Qffirms, 
The painful sensations of the Embargo are still felt. Fed-
eralists, such as they were, through the instigation of their 
directors, could parade in the street before the Governor's house 
in Boston; to request of him relief, under the pressures the7 
felt, from the embarrassments of our trade, as if he controled the 
Councils of foreign Nations and ~tw acts of Congress. This feder-
al movement, had its infiuence in stirring the People up to the 
resistance of the laws; when as the federal writers said, they 
were famishing with hunger, and at the same time, to represent the 
distress of the Embargo, in all ita shapes, they said, the rich 
produce of the Country, was per?-:shjpg in the barns of the Farmers, 
and in the store houses of the Merdhants, for the want of a mar-
let. They said that distress and famine had pervaded not only the 
humblf cottages of the poor, but thefPlendid edifices of the 
rich. 
The war-like tone of the administration was daily becoming more 
and more pron~unced. In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, and Tennessee the m:i.}.itia was preparing for possible con-
flict. In political circles the Federalist anti-war party showed increased 
strength in the spring elections in New lork and New ~gland, but they were 
still a minority with the South and iest seemingly eager to rush headlong 
, ... 
into a war for which the country was pitifully Unprepared. The ,'ederalists, 
in desperation, now launChed upon a course totally unexpected by their con-
stituents, and, as Henry Adams.comments, "their behavior, contradicting 
their own principles, embarrassed their friends still more than it confuse. 
their'enemies. n2 Throwing reasori to the winds, they approached the British 
minister, astonishing him by the lengths to which they were prepareato go, 
to save their commerceJ Foster wrote home: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Solomon Aiken, The Kise an Press f the Politic the 
United Statesa A Sermon, P.reached in acutt, liar 11, l.W.l, t Being the Aruma,) Fast, averhill, 1811, 17. 
2 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VI, Charles Scria-
ner's Sons, New York, 1890, 171-172. 
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The Federal leaders make no scruple of telling me·that they 
mean to give their votes for war, although they will remain silent 
in the debates; they add that it will be a short war of six or 
nine months. To my observations on the strange and dangerous na-
ture of such a policy, they shrug their shoulders, telling me that 
they see no end to restrictions and non-importation laws but in 
war; that war will turn out the Administration, and then they fill 
have their own way, and make a qpUd peace with Great Britain. 
On February 1st, two Federalists whose names ,,'oster did not in-
clude in his report, paid him a voluntary and unsolicited visit, in which 
.. they advised him what course to suggest to his government to pursue, in 
order to overthrow the administration, secure New England leadership in 
the country, and thus cement friendly relations with Britain. Foster's 
report reads as follows, 
The sum of these suggestions was that we should neither re-
voke our Orders in Council nor modify them in any manner. They 
said this Government would, if we conceded, look upon our con-
cessions as being the eftect of their own measure, and plume th~ 
selves thereon; that they only wanted to get out of their present 
difficulties, and if we made a partial concession they would make 
use of it to escape fulfilling their pledge to go to war, still 
however continuing the restrictory system; whereas it we pushed 
them to the edge of the precipice by an unbending attitude, tha1t 
then they must be lost, either by the disgrace ot having nearly 
ruined the trade of the United states and yet failed to reduce 
Great Britain by their system of commercial restrictions, or else 
by their incapacity to conduct the government during war. These 
gentlemen declared that they were for war rather than for the con-
tinuance of the restrictory system, even if the war should last I 
four years.2 
On liarch 9, l~ Madison again showed his desire to secure declar-
ation ot war against Britain. He placed bet ore Congress certain papers 
which he had been inveigled into b~g trom John HenrJi a British spy, pm· 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ~., 172. 
2 1l2J.g., 173. 
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porting to contain evidence of treason brewing in the New Englan~ states. 
Unable to sell these documents either to his employer, Governor Craig of 
Canada, or to the British government, Henry found a market in .Madison who 
was casting about for some means of retaliation to the rebellious New Eng-
landers. Madison, aided and abetted by ~n;oe, purchased the papers for 
~50,OOO, having persuaded Henry to relinguish his original demand for 
i125,000. The Federalists, remembering theiI visit to F'oster, were alarmed 
when they learned the circumstances, for Henry had travelled through the 
New ~and states and had been entertained in some of the best homes, whil 
unknown to them as a spy. Madison formally presented the material to the 
House, saying, 
"I l~ before Congress copies of certain documents, which re 
main in the ciepartment of state. ThE;rFROVE, that at a recent per 
iod, whilst the United States, notwithstanding the wrongs sustain 
ed by them, ceased not to observe the laws of peace and neutralit 
towards Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable professions 
and negotiations, on the part of the British government, through 
its public minister here, a secret agent was employed, in certain 
states, more es eciall at the seat of overnment in l4assachus.ttta 
in fomenting disaffection to the constituted authorities of the 
nation; and in intrigues with the disaffected, for the purpose of 
bringin& about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert 
with a ~itish force, of destroying the Union, and fOaring the eastern part thereof into a political connexion with eat Bri-~.111 
However, the documents were inconclusive and contained no more damaging 
statements concerning New England I treason I than they published daily in 
" 
their local papers. It seemed that Madison had paid out fifty thousand 
American dollars in salary to John Henry that the British government should 
have paid, all 'for a quantity of harmless conjectures which, it could safel 
11 
be assumed, were probably exaggerated as much as possible to sec~e favor 
from the spy's employer.. The Federalists snickered openly; Sullivan wrote, 
It is amusing that Mr. Madison should have "paid an ingenious 
Irishman fifty thousand dollars, for an attempt to render a ser-
vice to the object of his hatred, England. Still more amusing 
that all he got for his money, lU\s. a faiihful picture of Jefferso 
and himself, drawn by a British painter. 
On April 1st, Madison recommended an embargo to last sixty days; 
this measure was, of course, recognized as a~reliminary gesture to an ac-
tual declaration of war. The Senate, to delay things a bit, extended the 
measure to ninety days. 
Madison was renominated in liay for the presidency, and easily se-
cured his reijlection; he was opposed by the Federalist candidates, Clinton 
and Ingersol. Though he carried the electoral votes of Vermont and Penn-
sylVania, it was significant that the large and wealthy states of New York ; 
and Massachusetts voted against him, thus demonstrating their opposition to 
his war policy. 
l4adison I S message of June 1st was markedly hostile to England, 
citing as it did her various provocative acts against the United States, 
and recommending that definite action be taken. The message was referred 
to a committee whose report was of much the same tenor. When the House was 
asked to authorize a declaration of war, the issue met with violent opposi-
tion, only to be passed by a vote of 79-49. In the Senate the bill"' also 
met with trouble: the anti-war group held up the vote for two weeks, sug-
gesting alternative measures of letters of marque or reprisal, and the ar~ 
ing of merchant shipping. But the Senate, like the House, passed the bill 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ~., 290. 
I 
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by a majority of six votes (19-13). The President immediately ratified the 
action and the country was at war. Conceming the congressional vote,' Henry 
Adams states, 
Hardly one-third of the members of (,;ongress believed war to 
be their best policy. Almost anQt:aer third were Federalists who 
wished to overthrow the Administration; the rest were honest and 
perhaps shrewd men, brought up in the school of Virginia and Penn-
sylvania politics, who saw more clearly the evils that war must 
bring that the gpod it might cause, and who dreaded the reaction 
upon their constituents •••• By force.of will and intellect the 
group of war members [Clay, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes] held 
their own, and dragged Congress forward in spite of itself. l 
Sullivan asserted that the vote of the House proved the war to be 
the will of the South and hest, to protect the interests of the protesting 
North: 
In the House of Representatives the whole numbers of members 
was 128; of these 79 voted for the war; and of these (79,) 62 re-
sided south, and 17 north of the Delaware. The Senate consisted 
of 32 members, 19 of whom voted for the war, and 14 of these re-
sided south of the Velaware; and 5 of the 19, north. Putting to-
gether the war members, of both branches, residing south of the 
. Delaware, viz. 62 and 14, they make 76; which is four short of 
half of the whole number in both branches. Thus the war may be"" 
said to have been a measure 6f the south and ~, to take care of 
the interests of the north, much against the will of the latter. 
The whole number of members of both branches residing north of the 
Delaware was 68, of whom only 21 voted for the war.2 
John Lowell expressed the opinion of New England succinctly, 
Five years of successive commercial restriction, was found 
ineffectual; it made us grow leaner to be sure, but we were strong 
and able to survive it. Our persecutors had not patience to en-
dure our lingering death; they therefore got up the guillotine of 
a maritime war, to cut off our heads at a stroke. 3 
1 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VI, New York, 1890, 
170. 
2 William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public Events 
Boston, 1834, 311. 
3 A New England Farmer (John Lowell), Perpetual War. the Policy of lLr. l4adi· 
J2n, Boston, 1812, 4. 
; 
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.' In the meantime England had changed her policy and had developed a 
more tolerant view of the protests of the United States. She had no desire 
to engage in war with the States when she was struggling to defeat NapOleon. 
Sullivan thought that the United States goyernment deliberately insisted on 
., ..,. 
maintaining its hostile attitude: 
Between the 4th of March, 1809, when Mr Madison became Presi-
dent, and the 18th of June, 1812, when war was declared, England 
seems to have desired Sincerely, t~comprom1se the controversies 
with this country, and to av6id conflict. lItr. Erskine, a very 
young man, and not of much experience, was British minister here, 
on the 4th of March. An arrangement was made with him. I t was 
said at the time, that lir. Madison knew, or might have known, that 
he had exceeded his authority. This arrangement was disavowed in 
England, and Erskine recalled. He was succeeded by Francis James 
Jackson, whom the administration found so much to be displeased 
with, that all communication was cut off with him, and, as it was 
then thought, offenSively, and with the design to keep open the 
controversy. He was succeeded by Mr. Foster, who was equally un-
successful. He remained here till war was declared.l 
Two days before the declaration of war, a motion was made in the 
British House of Commons by Lord Brougham that the Orders in Council be re-
.... 
voked, insofar as they affected American vessels. There were two reasons 
why' such a move would be expedient at that time: Napoleon had, at least on 
paper, withdrawn the Berlin and Milan decrees, and it had been repeatedly 
said that the British government would remove its Orders if Napoleon would 
his; also, the fact that they were then engaged in heavy struggles with 
France hardly encouraged detailing needed troops and ships to America. Ac-
cordingly, four days after the American declaration of war, the Orders in 
Council, with the stipulation that America cease its hostile acts, were re-
1 William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public Events 
1834, 288-289. 
; 
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pealed, but too late to avert the catastrophe. When the news reached Ameri-
ca it had no other effect but to place the reasons for declaring war on the 
weaker claim, impressment. Only the Federalists upbraided'the government 
for carrying on a war when the main issue had been conceded. 
The members of the House who hai' o~posed the war issue were not 
to be silenced. It had been hoped by members ot the administration that the 
actual declaration of war would unite the co~try against the common foe. 
In this they were to be sadly disappointed. The Adnority in the House made 
issue of the fact that they were called into secret session to discuss the 
war, and thirty-four of the forty-nine members who had voted against the de-
claration issued a pamphlet embodying an official protest to the secret ses-
sion and the inadequacY' of the war claims: 
The momentous question of war, [stated the Pamphlet] with 
Great Britain, is decided. On this topic, so vital to your in-
terests, the right of public debate, in the face of the world, and 
especially of their constituents, has been denied to your repre-
sentatives. They have been called into secret session, on this . 
most interesting of all your public relations, although the c~ 
eumstances of the time and of the nation afforded no one reason 
for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension of the effect 
of public debate on public opinion; or of public opinion on the 
result of the vote. 
Eoccept the message of the President of the United States, ; 
which is now before the public, nothing confidential was communi-
cated. That message contained no fact, not previously known. No 
one reason for war was intimated, but such as was of a nature pub-
lic and notorious. The intention to wage war and invade Canada 
had beep, long since openly avowed. The object of hostUe menace 
had been ostentatiously announced. The inadequacy of both our 
army and navy for successful invasion, and the insufficiency of 
the fortifications for the security of our seaboard, were, every 
where, known. Yet the doors of Congress were shut upon the people 
They have been carefully kept in ignorance of the progress of 
measures, until the purposes of administration were consummated, 
and the fate of the country sealed. In a situation so extraordin-
ary, the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no act of theirs 
to sanction a proceeding so novel and arbitrary. On the contrary, 
15 
.' they made every attempt in their power to attain publicity for 
their proceedings. AU such attempts were vain. When this momen-
tous subject was stated, as for debate, they demanded that the 
doors should be opened. 
This being refused, they declined discussion; being perfect 
convinced, from indications too plain to be misunderstood, that, 
in the house, all argwnent, witri"~osed doors, was hopeless; and 
that any act, giving implied validity to so flagrant an abuse of 
power, would be little less than treachery to the essential rights 
of a free people. In the situation to which the undersigned have 
thus been reduced, they are compelled reluctantly to resort to 
this public declaration of such vi"s of the state and relations 
of the country, fS determined their judgment and vote upon the 
question of war. 
The main object for declaring war they disposed of in these words, 
The claim of Great Britain to the services of her seamen is 
neither novel, nor peculiar. The doctrine of allegiance for whic 
she contends is common to all the governments of Europe. France, 
as well as England, has maintained it for centuries. Both nation 
claim, in time of war, the services of their subjects. Both by 
decrees forbid their entering into foreign employ. Both recall 
them by proclamation. 
No man can doubt that, in the present state of the French 
marine, if American merchant vessels were met at sea, having 
French seamen on board, France would take them. Will any man ba-
lieve the United States would go to war against France on this 
account? 
The claim of Great Britain pretends to no further extent, 
than to take BritiSh seamen from private merchant vessels. In the 
exercise of this claim, her officers take American seamen, and ; 
foreign seamen, in the American service; and although she dis-
claims such abuses, and proffers redress, when known, yet undoubt 
edly grievous injuries have resulted to the seamen of the United 
States. But the question is, can war be proper for such cause, 
before all hope of reasonable accommodation has failed? ~en 
after the estinguisbment of such hope, can it be proper, until 0 
own practive be so regulated as to remove, in such foreign nation 
any reasonable apprehension of injury?2 
---------------~~~-------~------------------------------------------------
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On July 15th a meeting of protest against the war was h~ld in 
Faneuil Hall in Boston, and on the same day a similar group met in Middlese 
County in Massachusetts. August 6th saw a "rebel" convention in Boston, and 
in that same month a convention in Worcester. All echoed the sentiments of 
John Lathrop, who exclaimed, ltA war so unpopular, as the present war appears 
to be, cannot be supported."l 
The administration met its first d~ficulty of the war in the at-
tempted conscription of New England militia. On April 10, 1812, before war 
had been declared, but obviously in expectation of it, Congress had author-
ized Madison to "require of the executives of the several states and terri-
tories, to ••• organize, arm, and equip ••• their respective portions of one 
hundred thousand militia. lt2 Congress also authorized the President to ap-
point the general officers who would have charge of military organization 
and campaigns. To their other provisions they added that the President 
might call the militia into service Itin all the exigencies provided by thA, 
constitution." This clause gave the Federalists a loophole to dispute the 
demands of the national government. 
On the strength of the grant s of Congress, Secretary of "War Eusti t 
wrote the governors of the various states, and directed them to prepare 
their militia. On June 22, at the behest of the PreSident, General Dear-
born wrote, among others, Governor Strong of MassaChusetts and Governor 
Griswold of Connecticut, requesting that Massachusetts produce forty-one 
----------------------------~-----------------------------------------------1 John Lathrop, The Present War Unexpected, UnnecessarY, and Ruinous, Bos-
ton, 1812, 15. 
2 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 234. 
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companies, of which fourteen were to be artillery, and 27 infantrt; of Con-
necticut he requested five companies, two of artillery, and three of infant1)1 
Here the General made a grave error. For the forty-one companies requested 
of Massachusetts, he required only two of their officers, lieutenant-colon~ 
1 ..... 
where, as claimed by Dwight, MassaChusetts had the right to appoint a nativl 
major or general, since she was asked to provide what amounted to an army 
division. From Connecticut no officers what Siever were desired, and Connec-
ticut, forming a battalion, had the right to be commanded by a major. To 
add to the irritation of the two states, their militia were ordered by the 
General to report to the command of United States officers in various parts 
of their own states as well as in other New England sectors. lmmediately 
Connecticut and Massachusetts questioned the constitutional right of the 
President to call out the militia, since the nexigencies provided by the 
constitution" were not present in the existing situation. 
Governor Strong of Massachusetts called together the Legislature 
..... 
in special session in October, 1812, and addressed them, in part, 
The Constitution of the United States declared, that 'Con-
gress may provide for calling forth the militia to execute the 
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,' 
and the act of Congress of April lOth, 1812, authorizing a detach- ; 
ment of 100,000 of the militia, empowers the President to 'call 
into actual service any part, or the whole of said detachment, in 
all the exigencies provided by the constitution.' From these 
clauses in the constitution and the law of. April 10th, the Presi-
dent derives his authority to call the militia of the state's into 
actual service; and except in the exigencies above mentioned, he 
can have no authority by the constitution to do it. But there was 
no suggestion, either in the letter from the War Department, ••• or 
±n those from General Dearborn, that this state or Rhode Island 
[Where Dearborn proposed to send some Massachusetts troops] was 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 lill., 248. 
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invaded, or in imminent danger ot invasion; or t hat either ot the 
exigencies recognized by the constitutional laws ot the United 
States existed •••• 
I have been tully disposed to comply with the requirements 
ot the constitution ot the United States and the laws made in pur-
suance ot it, and sincerely regretted that any request should be 
made by an otficer of the natioaal. government to which I could 
not constitutionally conform.l -
The governor ot Connecticut made a similar speech to his council, 
who emphatically corroborated his sentiments. 
This board is not informed that the requisition of General 
Dearborn, said to be in pursuance of that ot the Secretary ot War 
of the 12th ot instant June, is grounded on a declaration made by 
the President of the United States, or notice by him given, that 
the militia are required to execute the laws of the Union, ..!Bm-
press insurrections, or repel invasions, or that the United-state. 
are in imminent danger of invasion. As none of the exigencies 
recognized by the constitution and laws of the United States are 
shoWll to exist, this board deem his excellency the Governor to be J 
of right, the commander in chief of the militia of this state, 
and that they cannot ~ be withdrawn from his authority.2 
Both states accordingly began to raise militia in defense of their own 
territor.y. Needless to say, their attitude was extremely irritating to ~ 
Madison, who saw no way to make them contorm. However, New England' s mili-
tia frequently submitted to United States command, particularly after the 
invasion of Washington and parts of Maine. But throughout the war, the 
soldiers of New England persistently retused to march outside United States 
boundaries, and in some instances, outside those ot their respective states, 
Madison complained to Gallatin ot the poor c08peration he was receiVing 
from the militia: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------'---
1 Ibid., 21.1-243. 
2 Ibid., 246. 
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Financially too, the government had trouble enlisting ~y support 
from New England. The attitude, HIt's Mr. l4adison's war -- let him pay for 
itl" was the prevalent spirit in the northern states, and thus the richest 
section of the Union refused its much neede~ support. The empty treasury 
had not bothered the President when he declared war, and he had gone ahead 
over the protest of wealthy New England; therefore he might look elsewhere 
for money. The lliddle States consequently hIlA to bear the brunt of the war; 
Gallatin described the extent of their sacrifices, 
The floating debt, consisting of outstanding Treasury notes 
and temporary loans unpaid, amounted, on the 1st of January, 1815, 
to eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, about 
four-fifths of which were also due to the Kiddle States •••• The 
banks made advances beyond their resources, either by their own 
subscriptions or by enlarging their discounts in favor of the su~ 
scribers. They, as well as several wealthy and patriotic citi.en~ 
displayed great zeal in sustaining the government at a critical 
moment, and the banks were for that purpose compelled to enlarge 
their issues.1 . 
New England, forced to industry by the restrictive system of the 
,.. 
government in imposing embargoes and non-importation acts, had found a reaciJ 
market in the rest of the country for her products. With no English goods 
available, specie flooded into New ingland's coffers, where, as far as the 
I 
war effort was concerned, it stayed. Gallatin estimated the amount of spe-
cie in the New England banks to be, 2 
In 
June, 1811 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11,709,000 
11 , 1812 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3,915,000 
It , 1813 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 6,171,000 
It , 1814 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 7,326,000 
In his financial report Gallatin noted that, 
------------------~---------------------------------------------------------1 The Writings of Albert Gallatin, In, ed. Henry Adams, Philadelphia, 187~ 
284. 
2 Ibid •• 283. 
2l 
The circulating capital of the United States, wbi.oh JlUat 8. 
ply the l0ans required in time of war, is concentrated in the 
large cities, and"principally north of the Potomac. The war was 
unpopular in the ~astern States; they contributed less than trom 
their wealth might have been anticipated; and the burden tell on 
the Middle States. The proceeds of loans (e~lusive ot Treasur7 
notes and temporary loans) paid into the Treasury from the com-
menoement of the war to the end of the year 1814 amounted to tort 
one millions ten thousand dollaa-S;. 
Of that sum the Eastern States lent • • • • • • • • ~2,900,OOO 
New York, Pennsylvania, liaryland, and) 
the District of Columbia ) •••••• 35,790,000 
The Southern and ~iestern States • ..., • • • • • • • • 2,320,oool 
Not content with merely refusing to aid the government during the 
war, the New England states actually supported the enemy, buying British 
bonds at a discount, and supplying them, for a price, with food for their 
~anadian forces; Sir George Prevost, the British commander, wrote to Lord 
Bathurst in England in August, 1814: 
Two thirds of " the army in Canada are at this moment eating 
beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the 
States of Vermont and New lork. This circumstance, as well as 
that of the introduction of large sums of specie into this pro-
vince, being notorious in the United States, it is to be expected 
Congress will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and 
under that apprehension large droves are daily crossing the lines 
coming into Lower Canada.2 " 
The national government made the mistake of trying to finance the 
war by loans, only to be secured at high interest, rather than to risk po 
larity by exacting heavy taxes from the people. The Olive Branch, enwnerat 
ing the faults of the administration, considered this its most outst~ding 
lapse: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------1 ~., 284. 
2 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VII, "Prevost to 
Bathurst, August 27, 1814 ii, 146. 
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The last and perhaps the most grievous and unpardo1iable error 
of the democratic party -- an error, pregnant with baleful conse-
quences to the finances and credit of the country, was, depending 
on loans for the support of the war, and deferring the imposition 
of taxes adequate to erect the superstructure of'public credit up-
on. This arose from the miserable and pernicious dread ot tor-
teiting popularity, and losing the reins of government -- a dread 
often the parent of the most desttlctive measures. The conse-
quence ot this highly reprehensible error was, that the loans were 
made to very considerable loss, and that the public credit ot the 
nation was most lamentably impaired. l 
In the summer of 1814 the war itsell finally approached the bor-
ders of Massachusetts. The British had already captured parts ot Maine, but 
now caused alarm in Massachusetts by the capture ot Castine, a small town at 
the mouth ot the Penobscot. Headquarters at Hoston received the added co~ 
munication that the British intended to make turther advances, and the need 
for adequate and prompt defense became increasingly evident. Since the na-
tional government had withdrawn all tinancial aid to the eastern states, the 
New Englanders were lett to tace the issue as they might. Accordingly, GOT-
ernor Strong of Massachusetts assembled the legislature, with this explana-
.. 
tion for his action, 
Since your last adjournment such important changes have taken 
place in the state ot our public affairs, and the war in which we 
have been unhappily involved has assumed an aspect so threatening I 
and destructive, that the Council unanimously concurred with me in 
opinion that an extraordinary meeting ot the Legislature was in-
dispensable. 2 
On the 7th of October the legislature ot Massachusetts vote,d 222 
to 59 on a resolution that the Governor's handling ot the detense ot the 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ll. Carey, The Olive BranCh; 2£, Faults on Both Sides, Philadelphia, 181.5, 
76. 
2 Theodore Lyman, A Short Account of the Harttord Convention TAken tra. 
Official DOCuments and Addressed to the, Fair ll!inged and We]), ~isposed to 
Which is added an Attested Copy ot the Secret Journal ot That Body, O. Ever-
ett, Boston, 1823, 5. 
23 
state be approved. On October 13th, the group authorized the govtrnor to 
raise a militia of ten thousand men for the defense of the state, by a vot~ 
of 252 to 71. And on October 16th the famous fifth resolution, authorizing 
a convention to be held at Hartford, passed the legislature by a vote of 260 
. 
.. .... 
to 90. The resolution read: 
Resolyed, That twelve persons be appointed as delegates from 
this Commonwealth to meet and confer with delegates from the other 
New England States, or any other, ~n the subject of their public 
grievances and concerns; and upon tne best means of preserTing our 
resources; and of defense against the ene~; and to devise and 
suggest for adoption by these respective States such measures as 
they may deem expedient; and also to take measures, if they shall 
think it proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all 
the United States, in order to revise the Constitution thereof, 
and more effectually to secure the support and attachment of all 
the people, by placing all upon the basis of fair representation.l 
Lyman recorded the votes of the various counties of Massachusetts 
on this resolution to refute charges that a small majority influenced the 
people to support such a convention; he states, 
These votes are recorded, and as we are not disposed to allo 
the democratic papers to call the proceedings of the people of • 
this State .t that time the work of sorry factions, cabals, and 
intrigues, we shall give the votes of the counties of Massachu-
setts Proper in detail as they appear upon the Journals. of the 
House •••• 
The county of Suffolk gave J2 yeas and o na • 
· · · · 
• • 
· · 
• 
II Essex 44 n 9 n • • 
· 
• 
· · 
• • • 
· n Middlesex 18 It 17 " • 
· · 
• • • • • 
" Norfolk 5 
It 11 n 
• • 
· · · 
• 
· 
• 
· 
• 
II Plymouth 9 " 3 
II 
• 
· 
• 
· 
• • • 
· 
• 
· II Bristol 13 It .' 1 II • • • • • • • • • • 
It Barnstable 4 n 2 " 
· 
• 
· · 
• • • 
· 
• • 
II Worcester 36 " 11 " • • • 
· · 
• 
· · 
• • 
" 
Hampshire 19 " 0 " • • • • 
· 
• 
· 
• • • 
" 
Hampden 12 " 3 " • • • 
· · · 
• • • • 
---------------------------------------~-----------------------------------
1 Ibid., 6. 
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.' .20 yeas and 2 nays The county of Franklin gave', •• . . . . . . . 
II Berkshire. • . . . . . . . 14 " 8 II 
226 yeas and 67 nays 
We have taken the votesof the House of Representatives as express-
ing more emphatically the voice of the people, and it appears that 
three quarters of all the citizeas.;.of this Commonwealth were, in 
1illd±, in favor of the Hartford Convention.! 
In such manner the celebrated Hartford Convention came into being. 
It was the direct result of what New England$onsidered governmental oppres-
sion and neglect, and the answer to the demand of the people for relief. 
The resolution once passed that a convention be held to discuss the sorry 
plight of the New England states, the Massachusetts Governor and legislature 
prepared to contact the other states to secure their approbation and atten-
dance. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 !!US., 6-7. 
I 
CHAPl'ER II .' 
The Opening of the Convention 
The approach to the Convention that the New England states now 
felt to be necessary for their survival undeJr, enemy attacks and the supposed 
indifference of the United States government, was accomplished by a letter 
sent by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the governors of the different 
.. 
states, inviting them to appoint delegates to the proposed convention at 
Hartford. The letter itself was written by John Phillips, president of the 
senate of Massachusetts, and Timothy Bigelow, speaker of the house. The pur 
pose of tb4 convention and the objects it had in view to accomplish became 
the meat of many a heated controversy, and the suspicion that somewhere in 
its structure lurked the seeds of separation and disaffection from the Union 
made the name 'Hartford Convention' a lasting stigma on all who had part in 
it. Nevertheless, this letter which each governor of his respective state 
received, was safely couched in terms which, while suggesting alteration 01 
the existing policy, yet spoke respectfully enough of the Unioni 
The general objects of the proposed conference are, first, to 
deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section of the 
Union is exposed by the course of the war, and which there is too 
much reason to believe will thicken round them in its progress, 
and to devise, if practicable, means of security and defense which 
may be consistent with the preservation of their resources from 
total ruin, and adapted to their local situation, mutual relation 
and habits! AND NOT REPUGNANT TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS MEl4BFlts OF 
THE UNION. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Theodore Lyman, A Sho~t Account of the Hartford Convention, Taken from 
Official Documents and Addressed to the Flair Minded and t~e Viell DisjoSed to 
Which is Added an AttestedCoD~of t~e Secret Journal of hat Bodv, oston, 
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Theodore Dwight in his History of the Hartford Convention, claimed that 
The great object of the states, then, in calling a conven-
tion, was, tg confer on the practicability of devising meanS g.t 
.security and defense - that is, to perform the task which the 
national government had thrown upon them in 1812, and which had 
been left upon them down to the time of appointing delegates to 
meet in convention, and which ha4 'I1OW become so im.perative that 
there was no room to avoid it.l 
In the actual report of the Convention the delegates confessed 
themselves to beltnaturally led to a consider,.tion ••• of the [immediate] dan-
gers and grievances which menaced" them, and that they, at the behest of the 
people of their various states, had in view "suggesting .means of present re-
lief"; in addition, the delegates stated that it was their purpose also to 
consider grievances "of a more remote and general description, in the hope 
of at taining future security. t12 
Upon the passing of the resolution by the Massachusetts House au-
thorizing the calling of a convention to meet at Hartford, and the appoint 
of delegates to attend, the aforementioned letter was dispatched to the v~­
ious states, and from Connecticut and Rhode Island came immediate and vigor-
ous response. Delegates were appointed by these three states and also by 
the two counties of Cheshire and Grafton in New Hampshire, and by the county; 
of Windham in Vermont. It was disappointing to the leaders in Massachusetts 
that a full representation of the New England states was not obtained, but 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833," 409-
~. . 
2 The Proceedings of a Convention of De1e~ates from the States of Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island; theounties of Cheshire and Grafton 
in the State of New ~pShire; and the County of Windhy in the StAte of 
Vermont; Convened at rtford in the State of Connecticut, December 15, 181 
Hartford, 1815, 6. 
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those states which did respond did so with enthusiastic popular approval, 
further indorsed by the Federalist victories in the subsequent congressional 
elections, 
It was with some misgiving, then,. that President Madison looked 
forward to the convention, for reports were about that a reconstruction of 
the Federal Union under the dictates of New England might not be improbable. 
The whole enterprise seemed to take the aspe~ of a conspiracy, accentuated 
by the utter secrecy which enveloped its proceedings. But it must be noted 
that the delegates appointed by the various states, while very prominent 
Federalists, yet represented the more conservative faction. Had New England 
at this time been less careful of her choice of delegates, then the conven-
tion might well have become a radical weapon, and sedition, if not actual 
secession and civil war, might reasonably have resulted. The exclusion of 
Josiah ~uincy from the convention is particularly noticeable in this respect 
He was highly prominent in the Federalist party, but held extreme views a~ 
to what should be the role 'of New England at this time. Therefore his omis-
sion from the chosen delegates would indicate their desire for moderation --
their policy was definite in demanding reform, yet, as they always main-
tained, they desired that reform to take place within the Union. That they 
knew their power at this stage of the war is needless to repeat. 
From lIassachusetts came George Cabot, Nathan Dane, William "Pres-
cott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Bigelow, Joshua Thomas, Samuel Sumner 
Wilde, Joseph Lyman, Stephen Longfellow, Jr., Daniel Waldo, Hodijah Bay-lies, 
and George Bliss; Connecticut delegated Chauncey Goodrich, John Treadwell, 
James Hillhouse, Zephaniah Swift, Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger 
I 
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Minot Sherman; Rhode Island sent Daniel Lyman, Samuel Ward, Edwar'ti Manton, 
and Benjamin Hazard; New Hampshire, Benjamin West and Mills Olcott; and Ver-
mont, William Hall, Jr. Of these men Otis later said, when defending the 
lawful intentions of the convention, that 
... ; 
they fairly represented whatever of moral, intellectual, or patri-
otic worth is to be found in the character of the New England com-
munity; that they retained all the personal consideration and con-
fidence which are enjoyed by the best citizens, - those who have 
deceased, to the hour of their deati; and those who survive, to 
the present time. l . 
None could question the characters of the men involved in the convention; 
John ~ncy Adams made no aspersions against their integrity, but held in-
stead that there were other persons of worth in MassaChusetts who held oppo-
site opinions to these men, yet who were not in attendance or represented 
therein. It might be well at this point to insert some references concern-
ing the characters of the delegates, particularly of the group from Massachu 
setts, who were dominant in the convention. The following excerpt from a 
confidential letter written just before the convention by John Lowell, is • 
lengthy but pertinent; Lowell wrote, 
For measures of wisdom and prudence, to be considered and 
adopted in common times of tranquillity, perhaps the choice could 
not have fallen on more suitable persons than those selected fro. 
our State. 
Whatever they propose will be received with great respect by 
the people; and the boldest measures would be considered prudent, 
if suggested by them. " 
But they are not calculated for bold measures. lir Cabot is 
undoubtedly the wisest man in our State, or among the very wisest • 
••• He is a very practical man, well acquainted with everything 
which concerns the best interests of a nation; but Kr Cabot has 
1 Henry Adams Documents Relating to New England I<'ederalism" 1800-1815, "An 
Appeal to the ~itizens of the United States," by Harrison Gray Otis; Boston, 
1877 86. 
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.' been always a desponding man as to our public affairs, and their 
downward course has confirmed his opinions. He hardly thinks the 
temporary preservation of the State worth the effort, and he is 
most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a dele 
gate. He has no confidence in the possibility of awakening the 
people. He will not, therefore, be in favor of any measpre's which 
will disturb our sleep. So at lea~t I tear; for I cannot find out 
from him what his opinions are. ;;. .. <, 
lir otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering -- today 
bold, and tomorrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It wou 
seem by his language that he is prepared for the very boldest mea. 
ures; but he receives anonymous let~rs every day or two threaten-
ing him with bodily harm. It seems the other party suspect his 
firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough measures; but a thou-
sand fears restrain him. 
Bigelow is really bold on the present question, has a just 
confidence in the power of Massachusetts, sneers as he ought to do 
••• at all the threats of vengeance of the other States; an~if he 
was well supported, I have no doubt that measures of dignity and 
real relief would be adopted. 
Prescott is a firm man, but extremely prudent, and so modest 
that he will too readily yield his own opinions to the counsels of 
others whom he respects. I think he will give his aid to measures 
calculated to procure solid redress. 
Mr Dane you know. He is a man of great firmness, approachiJ:llg 
to obstinacy, singular, impracticable; and, of course, it must be 
uncertain what course he will take. Honestly, however, inclined. 
lLr Wilde, of .Kennebec, is a very able man, but one of very 
great caution and prudence. He lives among a people naturally bad 
and violent; and I should fear that his counsels may be influenced I 
by that circumstance. 
These are the men who will have the greatest influence in our 
delegation. 
It is to be regretted that we had not chosen two or t~ee sucl 
persons as Daniel Sargent, William Sullivan, and volonel Thorndike 
I do not know that we have among the delegates a single bold and 
ardent man. I know it will be said that such men are not the fit-
test for counsel. That is perhaps true in common times; but in 
times of great trouble they are often the most proper, and, indeed, 
the only ones fit to direct and manage affairs. 
I should fear that the Connecticut delegation, though extreme-
30 
ly respectable, was of much the same character. .' 
If it is that expedient that nothing decisive should be done, 
then it is to be regretted that so respectable a Convention was 
called, because it tends to degrade and disgrace the members and 
the people who sent them. 
But, if effectual measures We'Fe in contemplation, it is in my 
judgment to be regretted that some few more active and resolute 
men were not elected. l 
Both Theodore Lyman and Theodore Dwight devote much space in their respec-
• tive books to the defense of the characters of these men. Their integrity 
was indeed unquestionable, however slight the bearing it might have had on 
their views regarding secession at that stage of affairs; but it might be 
fairly successfully maintained that their word could be accepted when they 
declared that no such alternative entered into the arguments of the dele-
gates or Journal of the convention, Particularly since no shred of evidence 
existed to the contrary. 
But the inviolable secrecy which surrounded the proceedings of the 
... 
convention fanned the suspicions of the rest of the country to no small de-
gree, especially in view of the fact that l4r. Jiadison' s emissary, sent to 
report on the gathering, was not permitted to attend. Added to this was the 
glaring fact, that though the report of the convention was published widely, 
its secret jounnal was not disclosed until 1820. The reason for this delay 
was explained by Dwight, 
When the Convention adjourned on the 5th of January, 1815, it 
was supposed that it might be necessary for them to hold a second 
.meeting. With that expectation, when they adjourned, they did not 
think it expedient to remove the injunction of secrecy under which 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Ibid., "Lowell to Pickering, Boston, December 3, 1814"; 411-412. 
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the members had been laid at the commencement of the s~sion; and 
the journal was sealed, and placed for safe keeping in the hands 
of the President. When it was found that it was not likely to be 
published, the charge of meditated sedition and treason was re-
peated in every quarter. l 
This omission, however, continued to expose the convention to intensive 
1- .,. 
abuse, and when the journal finally was published, it was done in an attan 
to vindicate the members and the states concerned from the stigma which en-
veloped the Hartford Convention. 
The first act of the convention upon assembling on December 15, 
1814, was to elect unanimously George Cabot President; Theodore Dwight, not 
a member, was chosen as Secretary. The second step was to appoint a co~ 
mittee on rules and order, and of their report subsequently submitted and 
approved, the following natation, as indicated above, became the cause of 
endless speculations and considerable calumnious insinuations. 
The most inviolable secrecy shall ,be observed by each member 
of this Convention, including the Secretary, as to all proposi-
tions, debates, and proceedings thereof, until this injunction 
shall be suspended, or altered.2 M 
A committee of five, Goodrich, OtiS, Lyman of Rhode Island, Swift, and Dane 
were appointed lito inquire what subjects will be proper to be considered by 
this Convention"; their report was given on Saturday, December 17, and was 
thereupon discussed. Another committee of five, Smith, Otis, Goddard, West 
and Hazard, was then appointed lito prepare and report a general project of 
such measures as it may be proper for this Convention to adopt". This be-
ing returned, it was discussed and amended, and Prescott and Dane were add-
1 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 381. 
2 Theodore Lyman, A Short Acoount of the Hartford eonvention, 24. 
; 
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ed to the committee to arrange the final draft. .' The points of discussion as 
outlined in the journal of the convention were, 
1. That it will be expedient for this Convention to prepare 
a general statement of the unconstitutional attempts of the Execu-
tive Government of the United States to infringe upon the rights 
of the individual States, in regard? to the militia, and of the 
still more alarming claims to infringe the rights of the States, 
manifested in the letter of the Secretary of War, and in the bills 
pending before Congress, or acts passed by them, and also to re-
commend to the Legislatures of the States, the adoption of the 
most effective and decisive measurea, to protect the Militia and 
the States from the usurpations contained in these proceedings. 
2. That it will be expedient, also, to prepare a statement, 
exhibiting the necessity which the improvidence and inability of 
the General Government have imposed upon the several States, of 
providing for their own defense, and the impossibility of their 
discharging this duty, and at the same time fulfilling the requi-
sitions of the General Government; and also, to recommend to the 
Legislatures of the several States, to make provision for mutual 
defense, and to make an earnest application to the Government of 
the United States, with a view to some arrangement, whereby the 
States may be enable to retain a portion of the taxes levied by 
Congress, for the purposes of self defense, and for the reimburse-
ment of expenses already incurred, on account of the United States 
3. That it is expedient to recommend to the several State • 
Legislatures, certain amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, hereafter enumerated, to be by them adopted and proposed. 
1. That the power to declare or make war, by the Congress 
of the United States be restricted. 
2. That it is expedient to attempt to make provision for 
restraining Congress in the exercise of an unlimited power, to 
make new States, and admit them into this Union. 
3. That the powers of !,;ongress be restrained in laying 
embargoes, and restrictions on commerce. 
4. That a President shall not be elected from the same 
State two terms successively. 
5. That the same person shall not be elected P~esident a 
second time. 
I 
r 
6. That an amendment be proposed, respecting stave re-
presentation, and slave taxation. l 
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The remainder of the convention was spent in discussion of these 
points and in preparation of the Report, and immediately upon the adjourn-
ment of that body on January 5, 1816, the_Pert was published and widely 
circulated. Two copies of it were sent to the Governor of each state --
one for his private use, and one to be placed before the State Legislature • 
Of the report Dwight remarks that, • 
The expectations of those who apprehended it would contain 
sentiments of a seditious, if not of a treasonable character, were 
entirely disappointed •••• Equally free was it from advancing doc-
trines which had a tendency to destroy the union of the states. 
On the contrary, it breathed an ardent attachment to the integrity 
of the republic. 2 
And the report of the convention does reiterate most emphatically the regard 
of New England for the Union and its complete loyalty to it; nevertheless, 
it proceeded to point out, with elaborate and efficient argument, the var-
ious places wherein the administration and the constitution of the United * 
States failed in their regard. The powers of the national government regar 
ing the calling out of militia were discussed at length. The fact that the 
authority of the national government on this point was constitutionally re-
str~cted to 'executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections and 
repelling invasions I gave New England grounds to dispute the use of the mili 
tia for tlMr. Madison's War", since it could not be classified strictly under 
one of these headings. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 !Jag., 29-30. 
2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 380. 
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It follows conclusively, [states the Report] , th4t for all 
general and ordinary purposes, this power [of calling the militi 
belongs to the states respectively, and to them alone. It is not 
only with regret, but with astonishment, the co~vention perceive 
that under the color of an authority conferred with such plain 
and precise limitations, a power is arrogated by the executive 
government, and in some instances sanctioned by the two houses of 
congress, of control over the milltla, which if conceded will 
render nugatory the rightful authority of the individual states 
over that class o~ men, and by placing at the disposal of the 
national government the lives and services of the great body of 
the people, enable it at pleasure to destroy their liberties, and 
erect a military despotism on the ~s.l 
Additional New Bngland grievances were, as outlined in the lieport, 
First. -- A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a com-
bination among certain states, by exciting local jealousies and 
ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of th 
Vnion, the control of public affairs in perpetual succession. To 
which primary object most other characteristics of the system may 
be reconciled. 
Sec9g,sU,y. -- The political intolerance displayed and avowed in 
extlud1ng from office men of unexceptionable merit, for want of 
adherence to the executive creed. 
Thirdly. -- The infraction of the judiciary authority and rights, 
by depriving judges of their offices in violation of the consti~u 
tion. 
Fourthly. -- The abolition of existing taxes, requisite to pre-
pare the country for those changes to which nations are always 
posed, with a view to the acquisition of popular favor. 
Fifthly. -- The influence of patronage in the distribution of 
offices •••• -
SixthlY. -- The admission of new states into the Union formed at 
pleasure in the western region, has destroyed the balance of powe 
which existed among the original States, and deeply affected thei 
interest. 
SeventhlY. -- The easy admission of naturalized foreigners, to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 American History Leaflets, 'Report of the Hartford Convention', ed. Al-
bert BUshnell Hart and Edward Channing, A. Lovell and Company, New York, 
1906, 17-18. 
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.' places of trust, honour or profit, operating as an inducement to 
the malcontent subjects of the old world to come to the States, 
in quest of executive patronage, and to repay it by an abject de-
votion to executive measure,. 
Eightly. -- Hostility to Great Britain and partiality to the late 
government of France, adopted as ~oincident with popular preju-
dice, and subservient to the roam Object, party power. Connected 
with these must be ranked erroneous and distorted estimates of th 
power and resources of those nations, of the probable results of 
their controversies, and of our political relations to them re-
spectively. 
• Lastly and principally. -- A visionary and superficial theory in 
regard to commerce, accompanied by a real hatred but a feigned 
regard to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance in efforts to 
render it an instrument of coercion and war.1 
But the delegates did not rest the entire blame for existing conditions upo 
the administration, though it is obvious from the above that they desired 
end of the 'Virginia dynasty' and a more liberal policy in regard to their 
commercial interests. "It is not conceivab1e,~ continued the Report, "that 
the obliquity of an administration could, in so short a period, have so 
nearly consummated the work of national ruin, unless favored by defects iQ. 
the constitution."2 Consequently, the Report proceeded to make the follow-
ing recommendations to the legislatures of the states represented at the 
Convention, and added certain amendments to the constitution to be proposed I 
to the national government: 
THEItEFORE RESOLVED, 
That it be and hereby is recommended to the legis1at~es of 
the several states represented in this Convention, to adopt all 
such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citi 
zens of said states from the operation and effects of all acts 
whicp have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United 
--------------------------------------------------~------------------------
1 Ibid., 17-19. 
2 Ibid., 19. 
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States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting the 1Id.1itia or 
other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, 
not authorized by the constitution of the United States. 
Resolyeg, That it be and hereby is recommended to the said 
Legislatures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application 
to be made to the government of the United States, requesting 
their consent ••• to be empowered~d~assume upon themselves the de-
fense of their territory against the enemy; and a reasonable por-
tion of the taxes, collected within said States, may be paid to 
the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the payment 
of the balance due said States, and to the future defense of the 
same •••• 
Resolved, That it be ,and hereby is, recommended to the Legis-
latures of the aforesaid states, to pass laws ••• authorizing the 
governors or commanders-in-chief of their militia to make detach-
ments from the same, or to form voluntary corps, ••• and to cause 
the same to be well armed, equipped, and disciplined, and held in 
readiness for service; and upon the request of the governor of 
either of the other states to employ the whole of such detachment 
or corps, as well as the regular forces of the state, or such part 
thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with the 
safety of the state, in assisting the state, making such request. 
to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or at tempted by 
the public enemy. 
Resolved, That the following amendments to the constitution 
of the United States be recommended to the states represented as 
aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the states legt 
latures, and in such cases as may be deemed expedient by a conven-
.~ion chosen by the people of each state •••• 
Fir§t. Representatives and direct taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several states which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective numbers of £ree persons, in-
cluding those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding 
Indians not taxed, and all other persons. {that is, Negroes]. 
SeCond. No new state shall be admitted into the Union by 
Congress, in virtue of the power granted b, the constitution, wit 
out the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses. 
Third. Congress shall not have the power to lay any em-
bargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United states 
in the ports or harbours thereof, for more than sixty days. 
Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the con-
currence of two-thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial 
I 
in~ercourse between the United States and any foreign na1.ion, or 
th~ dependencies thereof. 
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Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or author-
iz~ acts of hostility against any foreign nation,'without the con-
cut'rence of two-thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostil-
it~ be in defense of the territori!s of the United States when ac-
t~ly invaded. ~ ~ 
Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, 
sh~ be eligible as a member of the senate or house of represen-
.ta~ives of the United ~ates, nor capable of holding any civil 
ottice under the authority of the ~ted States. 
SeVenth. The same person shall not be elected president 
ot the United States a second time, nor shall the president be 
elected from the same state two terms in succession.l 
Th~ Report closed with the turther provision for another conven-
tion, Should their requests be ignored or the war not end. Three commission 
ers wer, dispatched to WaShington with the report of the Gonvention, only to 
find on theit" arrival. that peace had just been declared and their cause 
thereby rendered ridiculous. The general rejoicing which tollowed the Trea-
ty of Ghent ."as augmented stm more by the great American victory over the 
.-
British at N8w Orleans, the news of which arrived very shortly betore that 
of the eoncl~sion of peace. The fact of this triumph, so coincident with 
peace, -arme~ the hearts of the people toward the administration for what 
they c0tlsidefed brilliant handling of the war. The fact that the reasons 
for whieh waf had been declared were not even mentioned in the treaty of 
peace wQs overlooked by all in the heat of victory, and the Hartford ~onven­
tion baeame ~he object of general contempt for opposing the policy of the 
government. Concerning this situation Dwight comments bitterly, 
-------,----,---------------------------------------------------------------
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The fiush of feeling which this victory [New OrleahsJ occa-
sioned, drew the public attention away from the treaty of peace, 
and the vast expense of treasure_and blood which the war had 
given rise to; and the administration and their ~evoted friends, 
with their usual skill, turned it to their 01V11 account. As a 
never-failing source of profit to the leaders of the party in po 
er, the public resentment was excited against the opposers of the 
war, and particularly against tn. '.Bew England states, and the 
Hartford Convention became the theme of universal calumny and re-
proach. Not being able to find anything to justify this virulen 
in the report, it was alleged with as much apparent confidence as 
it it had been known to be a matter of fact, that although the 
report itself contained no evidenc,of treason, or even of sedi-
tion, yet the history of their secret proceedings, whenever they 
should be made public, would disclose an abundance of proof of 
the existence of both.l 
But the secret journal had been sealed and given for sate keeping to George 
Cabot at the close of the convention, and when it was found that it was not 
going to be published, heated charges of treason and sedition were flung at 
the New England participants. It 1f8.S indeed a mistake that the Journal was 
not published immediately, for when it did come out, it was so harmless a 
document that it could not convince the country that it was authentic, and 
.. 
as a consequence it did little or nothing to restrain the tide of resent-
ment against the Hartford Convention. 
---------~--------~-------------------~-~--------.. -- --~--------------
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CHAPl'ER III 
The Post-Convention Period 
However adversely the Hartford Convention was to impress the rest 
of the country in years to come, immediate1.Y .. ;upon its adjournment and the 
pUblication of the Report, the general reaction was one of relief. The~­
tional Intelligencer, semi-official voice of the Madison administration, 
• while still somewhat dazed over the apparently harmless conclusions of the 
delegates, issued the following rather passive comment: 
Certain it is, that the proceedings are tempered with more 
moderation than was to have been expected from the contemporaneous 
exposition, in the Eastern papers, of the views and objects of thE 
Convention. A separation from the Union, so far from being open-
ly recommended, is the subject only of remote allusion. If the 
object of calling the Convention really was to propose separation 
from the Union, they appear to be determined to effect it peace-
ably, if they can.1 
The Federalists too, seemed very much pleased with the results of 
the oonvention. In Massachusetts the General Court referred the report of. 
the convention to a committee which studied it thoroughly and brought back 
on January 25th the following appraisal: 
The Committee entertain a high sense of the wisdom and abUi- ; 
ty with which the convention of delegates have discharged their 
arduous trust; while they maintain the principle of State sover-
eignty, and of the duties which citizens owe to their respective 
State governments, they give the most satisfactory proofs of at-
tachment to the Constitution of the United States, and to the na-
tional Union. 2 .' 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Samuel Eliot Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray otis, Federalist, 
1765-1848, II, OPe cit., "National Intelligencer " Januarl14, 1815; Boston, 
1913, 157. (H~reafter referred to as, Morison, Life and Letters of HarrisoD 
Gray otis, pp.) 
2 Ibid., 160. 
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In the meantime the national government had passed a bill. author-
izing the raising and maintaining of state troops at its own expense, tor 
which action the Federalists took to themselves the credit. Regarding this 
turn of events, Gore, then senator from Mas~achusetts, reported back to 
Governor strong, 
My dear Sir, 
The bill tor State troops has passed the House with an 
amendment to the only section inte~sting to us, said not to be 
important. 
The result of the Hartford Convention is here, and af-
fords satisfaction to most, if not to all, -- to some, because 
they see not the point nor consequence of the recommendation as 
relates to taxes. 
The gentlemen had a difticult task, which, according to 
~ poor judgment, they have executed with wisdom and discretion.l 
On January 19th, Dr. Logan wrote his opinion of the Convention to Pickering 
I have with pleasure perused the proceedings of the Harttord 
Convention. The prudence and magnanimity of that body does the 
greatest credit to its patriotic spirit, and may afford a rally-
ing point to our distracted country. It appears nothing of wis-
dom can be expected from our public councils at Washington. 2 .-
Even Pickering, who had been an extremist in his views, was satisfied with 
the results of the Report. In his letter to Lowell, written January 23rd, 
he said, 
I think the report of the Convention bears the high charac-
ter of wisdom, tirmness, and dignity. They have explicitly pro-
nounced sentence of condemnation upon a miserable administration, 
and, stamped as it is with the authority of a body of men so emi-
nently distinguished, that judgment cannot fail of making a just 
impression where it is needed. They have made a declaration of 
principles the landmarks by which the Legislatures and the people 
may direct their course. And they have, in terms that none can 
mistake, and which our rulers, whatever for a time they may ef-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, Boston, 1878, 559-
560. 
2 Ibid. 560. 
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fect, will not venture to disregard, manitested a deterLination 
to apply those principles in corresponding measures, when the fu-
ture conductlor neglects of the government shall require their 
application. . 
But the hapless comadttee wbichhad been sent to Washington with 
a copy ot the recO.IIIDI.endations, _t as they ... w.re on their arrival with the 
news ot peace, were exposed to the liberal ridicule of their opponents. 
Ridicule hardened into contempt under the hands ot the Democrats, who turn-
... 
ed the situation to their own account and convinced the country that treach 
ery and treason had been the keynotes at Harttord. That connection with 
the Harttord Convention marked the political ruin of all concerned in it, 
is a talse conclusion, as many of those men held political oftices there-
after, but their participation in it did make them a mark for the insinua-
tiona of their opponents. 
There were many ardent Federalists, who, atter peace had been de-
clared, were not quite willing to abandon opposition to the administration 
. -and who wished to contlllue to thwart the national. government in every move 
it made. otis, however, led the greater part of the Federalist party in an 
intinitely wiser course. His biographer states that 
He perceived, within the tirst year of peace, that the Re-
publican party, having absorbed every Federalist principle of per 
manent value, did not intend to use its power to the detriment of 
New England's sectional interests, and that under these circum-
stances there could be no object in withholding Federalist suppo 
tram Madison and Monroe.2 . 
In the Columbian Centinel of December 26th, 181.8, Otis definitely declared 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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~' his stand in the course of a discussion on Massachusetts' war cla1mB: 
As at present 11 all t swell," -- and the measures of government 
are favorable not less to the interests of your part of the Union 
than to the rest; as a due disposition has been manifested to pro-
vide for the great interests of navigation, the fisheries and man-
ufactures, and you have no cause of complaint, I think the oftener 
your Governor, your Legislature, ~e'ur able essayists, and your 
great and good men, shew a readiness to approach the national gov-
ernment, to give it just credit for what it deserves, and to sup-
port its measures, the more effectually will they baffle the wiles 
of those who wish that collisions may be eternal, wear off the 
edge of prejudices, and reconcile taeir opponents to the merit of 
their claim.l 
Otis was senator from l4a.ssachusetts from 1817 to 1822, and this 
position was made especially difficult for him since suggestions from l4assa-
chusetts were generally accepted with poor grace, and because he was contin-
ual1y open to attacks in debate upon his own and the treason of his state. 
This attitude led hiDl to assume the defense of the Hartford Convention, and 
under the pseudonym • One of the Convention' 2 he bepn what was to become 
first of many vindications of that body. The fact that the secret journal 
' .... 
had not yet been published added fuel to the various attacks on the members 
of the Convention, and it was to accomplish its publication, therefore, and 
to defend the integrity of those concerned, that Otis became involved in 
political controversy. His first step was to consult the surviving members 
of the group and to obtain their consent to the publication of the journal. 
To each delegate, then, he sent tbe following letter, 
Dear Sir: It has occurred to me that justice to the States repre-
sented in the late Hartford Uonvention seems to require that the 
private journal of their proceedings should be deposited in some 
place to which access may be had by any person disposed to give 
---------------------------------------------------------~-------------------
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.' them publicity. You need not be informed of the disposition of a 
numerous class, to impute to that Convention projects that would 
not bear the light, and to produce if possible a general opinion 
that the things which are seen affDrd no clue to the unholy mys-
teries of our conclave. While as individuals we regard these ef-
forts with unconcern, we ought not perhaps to be indifferent to 
the effects of an erroneous public, opinion on this subject upon 
the present age and posterity; iiP 1;he mere unvarnished joumal 
would be sufficient for its correction. Mr. Cabot, Mr. Prescott, 
and other members in this vicinitT concur in these sentiments, and 
if you should be content that we may make such a disposition of 
that journal as may be thought best for the object here expressed, 
I request of you the favor to signiIY your acquiescence by a line 
to Mr. Cabot with convenient dispatch. 
Signed, _______ 1 
In due course consent was received from all concerned (except from two mem-
bers, who made no reply at all), and a copy of the journal, together with 
an explanatory letter, was sent to the National Intelligencer for publica-
tion. Perhaps the biggest mistake the delegates made was not to publish the 
journal immediately atter their object (termination of the war) had been at-
tained; but it seems almost as glaring an error to have published it so man 
,-
years laters, especially in view of the fact that it contained nothing more 
incriminating than had already appeared in the Report. While this situatio 
could not have injured them any more than the Report, had it been published 
immediately, when it did come out it was the more damaging because of its 
innocence, and from all sides came the charge that it was not the true re-
cord. Doubts of the veracity of the journal of a necessity impugned .~he 
word of George Cabot, who had presented it with a certificate of its integ-
rity: 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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.' I, George Cabot, late Pr.,ident of the Convention, assembled 
at Hartford, on the fifteenth day of December, 1814, do hereby 
certify, that the foregoing is the original and only Journal of 
the proceedings of that Convention; and that the twenty-seven 
written pages, which compose it, and the printed report, hereto-
fore published, comprise a faithful and complete record of all thE 
motions, resolutions, votes, an~ proceedings, of that Convention. 
-And I do further certify, that ;Ptflis journal has been constantly 
in my exclusive custody, from the time of the adjournment of the 
Convention, to the delivery of it into the office of the SecretarJ 
of this Commonwealth. 
Boston, November 16, 1819. 
George Cabotl 
Of course, the other meabers of the Federalist party flew to the defense of 
Cabot's character, as well as those of the other members of the convention. 
William Sullivan, Theodore Lyman, and Theodore Dwight particularly devote 
a portion of their books to this object. Said Dwight, 
Mr Cabot was a man of the highest respectability for under-
standing, integrity, and.talents. He had more reputation to lose 
than scores together of those who would impeach his veracity can 
lay claim to or boast of. His declaration on any subject would 
have been taken for truth, wherever he was well known, with as 
much confidence as if it had been sanctioned by the most solemn,. 
oath. Here it is impeached [by assertions that the journal was 
falsified] by nothing but the unsupported assertions or sugges-
tions of political partizans -- men without manners, without prin 
ciples, and of course without reputation.2 
In 1831, Roger Minot Sherman, a member of the convention, testified under ; 
oath in a libel case, that 
There was not, to the best of my recollection, a single motion OJ: 
subject of debate, but what appears in the Journal.. ... 1 be;J.ieve 
I know their proceedings perfectly, and that very measure, ~ 
or pro po sea, has been published to the world.3 
Dwight himself testified in the capacity of a 'disinterested witness' con-
------------------~~-----------------~-----------------------------------1 Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, 35-36. 
2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 403-404. 
3 Ibid., 404. 
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cerning the veracitr of the journal, which he, as Secretary, had &mpiled; 
But if a disinterested witness should be kept back, who might 
be produced, an inference might be drawn by some caviller, from 
that circumstance, unfavorable to the character and conduct of the 
Convention. Such a witness is the author of this work - the Sec-
retary of the Convention; and he feels it a duty which he owes to 
truth, and the characters of as ~Spectable, patriotic, and vir-
tuous a body of men, as ever were collected on any occasion, to 
say, in the most positive and unhesitating manner, and with all 
the solemnity which the nature of the case requires, that the 
JOURNAL AND THE REPORT OF THE CONVENTION, CONTAIN A FULL, COll-
PLETE, AND SPECIFIC ACCOUNT OF ALL iHE MOTIONS, VOTES, AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION.l 
Thomas Jefferson was the unwitting cause of another long and heat-
ed controversy on the already much-disputed designs of the Hartford Conven-
tion. In a letter to vvilliam Giles, written December 25, 1825, Jeffereon 
mentioned an interview with John Quincy Adams, in which he stated that Adams 
had informed him that certain citizens of Massachusetts had engaged in trea-
sonable negotiations with the British, and that the repeal of the embargo 
would be absolutely necessary to win back those who were inclined toward 
dieunion. The letter reiterates that Jefferson was none too sure of his .... 
statements, since the events had become confused in his mind over that per-
iod of time, and that the impressions he relates are "the best exertion of 
a waning memory that he could command". Nevertheless, this communication 
to Giles was the first log on the fire of a lengthy battle on the ever-fer-
tile subject of New England's deportment during the war. Said Jefferson's 
letter: 
" 
He ~ohn ~uincy Adams] spoke, then, of the dissatisfaction of 
the Eastern portion of our confederacy with the restraints of the 
embargo then existing, and their restlessness under it; that there 
---------------------------------------------------------------~------------
1 ~., 405. 
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was nothing which might not be attempted to rid themsel*es of it; 
that he had information of the most unquestionable certainty, tha 
certain citizens of the Eastern States (I think he named Massachu 
setts particularly,) were in negotiation with agents of the Brit-
ish government, the object of which was an agreement that the Bew 
England States should take no further part in the war then going 
on; that, without formally declaring their separation from the 
Union of the States, they should.;;.w'ithdraw from all aid and obedi-
ence to them; that their navigation and commerce should be free 
from restraint and interruption by the British; that they should 
be considered and treated by them as neutrals, and as such might 
conduct themselves towards both parties, and at the close of the 
war, be at liberty to rejoin the copfederacy. 
He assured me that there was eminent danger that the conven-
tion would take place; that the temptations were such as might 
debauch many from their fidelity to the Union; and that, to enabl 
its friends to make head against it, the repeal of the embargo wa 
absolutely necessary • 
••• However reluctant I was to abandon the measure ,(a measur 
which, persevered in a little longer, we had subsequent and sat is 
factory assurance, would have effected its object completely), 
from that moment, and influenced by that information, I saw the 
necessity of abandoning it; and, instead of effecting our purpose 
by this peaceful weapon, we must fight it out, or break the Union 
I then recommended to ~ friends to yield to the necessity of a 
repeal of the embargo, and to endeavor to supply its place by the 
best substitute in which they could procure a general concurrenc,1 
I cannot too often repeat that this is not pretended to be . 
the very words which passed; that it only gives faithfully the im 
pression remaining on my mind •••• l 
The publication of this letter led John Quincy Adams to authorize a state-
ment which appeared October 21, 1828, in the National Intelligencer, in 
which article it was said that J·etferson had surely erred, since at the tim 
the supposed conversation had taken place, Adams was not in the country. 
The article asserted that, 
1 Henry Adams, D~cuments Relating to New England Federalism, 'Thomas Jeff-
erson to William. Giles, December 25, 1825,' 12-13. 
; 
~ ~---------------------------------------------------4~7 
In August, 1809, Mr. Adams embarked for Russia, nearly' three 
11111 before the Declaration of War, and did not return to the 
Urahd States till August, lS17, nearly three ye~s after the con-
c]lll)n of peace •••• It was impossible, therefore, that Mr. Adams 
coo have given any information to Mr. Jefferson, of negotiation~ 
bJltizens of Massachuseits with British agents, during the war, 
onring relation to it. 
;.J. of,; 
The intervieio which Mr. Jefferson referred, continued the National 1n-
telligencer,bk place on March 15, 180S, in which conference Mr. Adams 
had only mellilned the embargo indirectly, and N .• w England I s efforts to ob-
tain its refill were hot in any way discussed. But both knew that the Gov-
ernor of NOVlI~otia had written to t a person in the State of Massachusetts 
in the summellt 1807, before the embargo had been instituted, and from thai 
incident, co~ed with ~ other facts t and with the known resistance of Massa-
chusetts to iiadministration, "Mr Adams and Mr Jefferson drew their infer-
ences, whichllbsequent events doubtless confirmed". 2 But these inferences 
neither had municated to the other, and no other confidential interview 
had taken pI111 between them during the administration of Jefferson. How-
ever, some III~rs which Adams had written to Giles after he (Adams) had re-
signed his SIll in the senate in May, 1905, warned that a continuance of th4 
embargo woul{1e met with "forcible resistance, supported by the Legisla-
ture, and pnlUy by the Judiciary of the State", and that if the national 
government s~t to end the resistance by force of arms, a civil war would 
undoubtedly rII\ll.t, in which event "he bad no doubt the leaders of the part. 
would secureme cooperation with them of Great Britain. II Adams had turthe. 
1 Corresponlll~e Between John Quin~ Adams, Esquire, President of the Un:lt-
ed States, aM~everal Citizens of ssachusetts Concerning the Charfie of a 
Design to DillLve the Union Alleged to Have EXisted in That state, oston, 
lS29, 6. 
2 Ibid., 6-1, 
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.' asserted in these letters that he had "unequivocal evidence, although not 
provable in a court of law" that it had been their object for some time to 
secure severance with the Union, and that in the case of civil war they 
would assuredly turn to Great Britain for the necessary aid. 
;.J. oil' 
That Jefferson had seen these letters, Adams never knew, but he 
believed that he had read them and had thus come to confuse them over a per-
iod of years with the conversation of March, 1.808. Adams "certainly had no 
objectionlf, cootinued the article, "that they should be communicated to Mr 
Jefferson; but this was neither his intention nor desire. ,,1 
But the publication of Jefferson's letter and adams' response were 
not destined to go unchallenged, for they evoked from New England a demand 
for proof of the charges made, and began the celebrated and brilliant con-
troversy between the Massachusetts Federalists and John ~uincy Adams. It 
will be remembered that these events occurred in 1828, and the controversy 
resolved itself not so much around the letters as around the more heinous .... 
Hartford Convention, as being the culmination of the treasonable tendencies 
of New England. 
Adams had no desire to become involved in any dispute with the Nell I 
Englanders, but they demanded that he prove his statements or retract them. 
The follow.ing,letter was sent him, consequently, dated November 26, 1828: 
The undersigned citizens of Massachusetts, residing in Boston 
and its vicinity, take the liberty of addressing you on the sub-
ject of a statement published in the "National Intelligencer" of 
the 21st of October, and which purports to have been communicated 
or authorized by you •••• [Then follows a summary of Adams' state-
ments as outlined above]. 
The object of this letter, therefore, is to request you to 
------------------------------------------------.---------------------------
1 Ibid. 8-9. 
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state -
First, Who are the persons designated as leaders of the party 
prevailing in Massachusetts in the year 1808, whose object, you 
assert, was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the 
Union, and the establishment of a separate confederacy? and, --
Secondly, The whole evidence.o~ which that charge is founded. 
It is admitted in the statement of the charge that it is not 
provable in a court of law, and, of course, that you are not in 
possession of any. legal evidence to maintain it. The evidence, 
however, must have been such as in y,Rur opinion would have been 
pronounced unequiVQcal by upright ana honorable men of discriminat 
ing minds; and we may certainly expect from your sense of justice 
and self-respect a full disclosure of all that you possess. 
A charge of this nature, coming as it does from the first 
magistrate of the nation, acquires an importance which we cannot 
affect to disregard; and it is one which we ought not leave unans-
wered. l 
H. G. Otis 
Israel Thorndike 
T. H. Perkins 
Wm. Prescott 
Daniel Sargent 
Jom Lowell 
Wm. Sullivan 
Charles Jackson 
Warren Dutton 
Benj. Pickman 
Henry Cabot 
Son of the late George Cabot 
C. C. Parsons 
Son of Theophilus Parsons, 
Esq. deceased'" 
Franklin Dexter 
Son of late Samuel Dexter 
Hoping to conciliate the injured Federalists, Adams wrote a letter 
explanatory of his motive in authorizing the statement which had appeared in I 
the National Intelligencer, assuring them that his intention had not been to 
offend them personally, nor the memory of their fathers who had taken part 
in the Hartford Convention: 
••• The statement authorized by me, as published in the "Na-
tional Intelligencer, It was made, not only without the intention, 
but without the most distant imagination of offending you or of in 
__________ J~!~_~l_~~=_~f_~~l_~~~~~~_~~=_~~~~~!!ll_!~~_~~=-£~~!=-~~-=­
I Henry Adams, Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 'To the Honor-
able John Quincy Adams', 43-45. 
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.' pressly disavowing a charge which was made before the public, 
sanctioned with the name of the late Mr. Jefferson, imputing to 
certain citizens of MassaChusetts treasonable negotiations with 
the British government during the war, and expressly stating that 
he had received the information of this FR<J4 ME. On the publica-
tion of this letter, I deemed it indispensably due to myself, and 
to all the citizens of Massachus~tt<s, not only to deny havinf ever 
given such information, but all kb~ledge of such a fact •••• 
Adams closed his letter with an appeal to let the matter end there, but suc 
was not the design of Otis and his friends. In their names Otis undertook 
• to prepare a very clear and masterly defense of the purposes and proceedings 
of the Hartford Convention, which was published under the title, "Appeal of 
Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the United States, dated 28th 
January, 1829. n 
The Hartford Convention had been attacked principally on the 
grounds that it was an unconstitutional body, assembled in secret, to plot 
seditious and treasonable action against the Union. Otis in the 'Appeal' 
defended it on each point. The legality of the Convention he based on the 
peoples' right of petition: 
••• It will not be doubted that the people have a right, "in 
... 
an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the 
common good," and request of their rulers, "by way of addresses, 
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and I 
of the grievances they suffer. It This is enumerated in the con-
stitution of Massachusetts among our natural, essential, and un-
alienable rights •••• 
If all the citizens had the right, jointly and severally, ~.o con-
sult tor the common good and to seek tor a redress of their griev 
&nces, no reason can be given why their legislative assembly, 
which represents them all, may not exercise the same right in 
their behalt.2 
The unlikeliness of a secret agreement tor disunion or any other 
l~-Ibid::-TR;ply-ot-John-~~ey-Ida;;-to-th;-Lett;r-of-i&;;aeh~ett;-Feder: 
aliets, dated 30th December, 1828',50. 
2 Ibid., 'Appeal of Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the Unite 
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.' treasonable action, Otis discounts b7 what might seem a rather weak premise: 
the fact that the meeting was prepared for openly, attended b7 the fanfare 
of the press: 
If ••• there had been any secre~ plot for a dismemberment of 
the Union, in which it had been desired to engage the neighboring 
States, the measures for that purpose, we may suppOse, would have 
been conducted in the most private manner possible. On the con-
trar7, the r.eSGlution of our legislature for appointing their dele-
gates, and prescribing their powers and duties, was Openl7 dis-
cussed, and pissed in the usual ma~r; and a COP7 of it was imme-
diately sent, b7 direction of the legislature, to the governor of 
ever7 State in the Union., 
That report - which was published immediately after the adjourn-
ment of the convention, and was soon accepted b7 the legislature 
-- holds forth the importance of the Union as paramount to all 
other considerations •••• l 
As a further proof that the efforts of the convention were legal 
and loyal, otis emphasized the point that the government of the United 
states approved and passed in Congress one of the most important issues 
which concerned the New England States -- the power to maintain and organize 
state troops, to be paid b7 the national government and used within the 
state or in an adjoining state. "Had this act of Congress passed before the 
act of Massachusetts for organizing the convention," declared OtiS, "that 
convention never would have ex1sted."2 
Otis and his colleagues were luckil7 spared the pain of reading 
Adams' reply to this apologia. His rebuttal was a bitter and persona,t at-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
States, dated 28th January, 1829,' by Harrison Gray Otis, et al, 81-82. 
1 Ibid., 85. 
2 Ibid., 86. 
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.' tack upon him and upon the convention. It was written upon Adams' return 
to Quincy after having left Washington in what seemed to him disgrace and 
the ruin of a valuable career. He was irritated, too, by the various petty 
attacks made upon him by his enemies, and ~t < was in a spirit hardly condu-
., .. ~ 
cive to genefosity that he wrote the lengthy answer to the New England Fed-
eralists. On its completion, however, Adams' friends advised him to sup-
press it, filled as it was with bitter denun~ations of OtiS, and since als 
it would not be salutary to the public good "to revive the memory of North-
ern schemes of resistance to national authority, at a time when the Union 
was staggering under the shock of similar projects in South Carolina and 
Georgia."l Says Henry ~s, 
He [Adams] suppressed the publication; and it was not long before 
the patriotic course of Mr. Otis, at the time of the nullificatio 
excitement, led~. Adams to rejoice at t~e suppression, and to 
look up?n Mr. Otis with more kindly eyes. 
Relating to the suppression of Adams' 'Reply', Morison states, 
This course was wise, for the document, though conclusive as 
to the existence of a disunion plot in 1804, and an able presen-
tation of the conspiracy theory of the Hartford Convantion, fails 
to bring forward a single fact sufficient to justify an impartial 
historian in accepting that theory as correct.3 
Otis was much elated, however, at Adams I supposed silence, and he 
construed this to mean that he had finally vindicated himself and his fello 
members of the convention from the charges which had faced them continuousl 
since its adjournment, but which never before had come from so high an auth 
ority. It was only in 1877 that Henry Adams at long last felt it possible 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Henry Adams, Preface to Documents Relating to New England l"ederalism, vi 
2 Ibid., vii. 
3 UOrison, Life and Letters of Harrison Ural Otis, II, 250. 
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to release Adams' 'Reply'. He made this decision upon finding in Henry Ca-
bot Lodge's publication of the Life and Letters of George Cabot, an impart! 
treatment of the period, an indication that the old hates had subsided, and 
that the editing of Adams t harsh aspersions ... Yi9uld not reopen the issue save 
in historical circles. He deleted fraa the manuscript, however, those pas-
sages which were purely a personal attack on Otis and which had no bearing 
,.. 
on historical evidence; yet, as he explains, certain of the passages which 
are untouched because ot. their historical value, are equally as damaging to 
Otis as those omitted. 
John Quincy Adams was convinced that, under the secrecy of the 
convention, and in vie. of the hostile attitude of New England to the admin-
istration, there certainly existed unlawf'ul designs against the Union. Con-
cerning the character of the Hartford Convention he wrote, 
The Hartford Convention •••• as not a committee of a legisla-
tive body discharging merely the duties of making a public report ... 
of their doings to the constituents; and the attempt to so repre-
sent them can have no other object than to disguise their real 
character, which was that of an unconstitutional congress of mem-
bers from the five New England States, appointed partly by feeble 
majorities of three of t he legislatures, and partly by not more 
factious county conventions, -- all consisting of the most invet- I 
erate adversaries to the administration of the government of the 
United States, then struggling with all the difficulties and dan-
gers of a formidable and desolating foreign war. 
The tact that the right of petition rested in the people the~ 
selves, not in a delegation, was not missed by Adams: 
[Otis] must not ••• in undertaking to show "the constitutional 
right of a State to appoint delegates to such a convention", place 
it upon the ground of the constitutional "right of the people to 
---------------------------------------------------~------------------------1 Henry Adams, D2c~ents ftelat~ toNe. Ez:lglAAd Federalism, 'fTO the Citi-
zens of the United States", by ohn ~cy adams, 252. . 
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.' petition" the government for the redress of grievances. This is a 
right reserved by the Constitution of the United States, and by 
the Constitution of Massachusetts, to be exercised by the people 
in their primitive capacity; and, far from being delegated to the 
legislature, cannot be assumed by them without a usurpation of the 
right of the people themselves.l 
It was the opinion of otis, however.i that the situation necessitat.-
ed the handling of the petition by delegates rather than by the people them-
selves, since, as he said, "in the state of distress and danger which then 
• oppressed all hearts, it was to be apprehended ••• that large and frequent 
assemblies of the people might lead to measures inconsistent with the peace 
and order of the community.n2 He further concluded that if each one of the 
states had the right of individual appeal to the central government, surely 
several states of the same conviction might "consult together for the same 
purpose" ••• and that "the only mode in which they could consult each other 
was by a mutual appointment of delegates for that purpose."3 
That the convention was a violation of the Constitution, Adams 
was convinced. He based his second argument on this reasoning: 
There is another difficulty, too, which Mr. otis must get 
over, when he undertakes ••• to defend the lawfulness of that assem-
bly: it is that provision of the United States which, in express 
terms prescribes, that "no State shall, without consent of Con- ; 
gress, enter into any agreement or compact with any other State. 
Art 1, #10. There is a previous provision, in the same section, 
that no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confedera-
tion. This, indeed, is positive and unqualified •••• A compact, by 
the force of the terms, imports a written engagement. An agree-
ment may be written or verbal, formal or informal. The object of 
the ••• Constitution ••• is to forbid them all ••• because every such 
agreement or compact to which the Congress representing the whole 
Union would not give their consent, must, in its ,nature, strike at 
the vitals of the Union itself. Since the existence of the Con-
stitution of the U~ted States, the Hartford Convention is the o~~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
1 .B?!s!., 254. 
2 Ibid., "Appeal to the ~itizens of the United States,u by H.G. Otis, 82. 
3 l'6Id., 83. 
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.' instance in which this provision has been substantially violated. 
A weakness in Otis' defense, which did not pass unnoticed by Adams, was tha 
the actual report of the Hartford Convention had much less to do with peti-
tion than it did with suggested amendments ~o the constitution: 
Petition for them? No; but elect twelve delegates to go to 
Hartford, and there consult ••• with bther representatives from th 
other states ••• not about petitioning for redress of grievances, 
but about amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 2 
• However ably Adams' repartee disposed of the good intentions of 
the delegates at the Hartford Convention, its conclusions were still theo-
retioal and unproven. ~rison evaluates his deductions briefly: 
Adams' general thesis can be sustained only by the most un-
fair twisting of the plain meaning of the Report, which threatene 
ultimate secession, it is true, in oase the causes of New England 
calamities became "radical and permanent. It But no statesman or 
party of the ante-bellum period of our history failed at some tim 
or other to regard secession as a measure of ultimate resort a-
gainst sectional oppression. Within five years of the date of 
the Hartford Convention, threats of secession were heard from the 
Southern Democrats on the floor of Congress; within ten years the 
Governor of Kentucky threatened secession if the Supreme Court ~ 
tempted to enforce its deCisions.) 
Henry Cabot Lodge defends, on Adams' own ground, the constitution 
ality of the Hartford Convention, as opposed to his charge against it: 
If, by the Hartford Convention, certain States entered into 
an 'tlgreement or compact, tI they violated the Constitution in so do 
ing. But they did nothing of the kind. The delegates were ap-
pointed to "conter with each other, and devise means for their 
oommon defense." They were to pave the way for a possible future 
"agreement or compact," but they were to make none themselves. 
The States are not forbidden to conter and offer recommendations 
to the several Legislatures, and this has been done in several in 
stances by commissioners. Moreover, there must be some binding 
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255-256. 
2 Ibid., 254. 
) Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 158. 
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4" force in order to make an agreement or. compact, and here there 
was none. No State was in any way bound by anything said or done 
at Hartford; and this, of itself, shows the non-existence of any 
"agreement or compact." The authority intrusted to the President 
to call the Convention., together again could not alter the char-
acter of the body as at first appointed. They had power merely 
to recommend to their several Lf3gislatures, who aight accept or 
reject their recommendations as iH!y pleased. The States were at 
full liberty to confer. This was all that was done at Hartford, 
and the Convention was therefore strictly within the letter of th 
Constitution.l . . 
What the Convention might have beeIf. is an extremely fertile, but 
purely speculative, topic. It might reasonably have led, considering the 
condition of the country and its crying need for the full c08peration of 
its citizens, to the ready submission of the national government to New 
England's demands for their sectional well-being; or it might have sent its 
constituents reeling into secession and civil war, at a time when the gove 
ment was so hard pressed by the war with Britain. The possibility of New 
England's establishing a separate peace with Great Britain might have cease 
to be only a phantom to disrupt the ease of the administration, and have 
come a real threat to national security. It is, of course, impossible to 
make any positive conjecture as to what might have occurred had the war not 
ended so opportunely, but after a study of the situation, one is inclined I 
to agree with Henry Cabot Lodge that nothing radical would have been at-
tempted immediately: 
That Convention was the exponent of a strong separatist feel 
ing. The bare fact of its existence proved the strength of the 
separatist forces at work in the community. Yet the men who went 
to Hartford used these separatist forces to maintain the Union. 
In short, they said plainly to the general government, "unless yo 
-----------------------------------------------------------------.---------
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alter your present policy, a dissolution of the Union ldil ensue. II 
They intended to coerce the administration by threatening them 
with separation. If their threat was attended to, the Union would 
be saved; if not, it is mere conjecture whether the Federalists 
would have pushed matters to extremity. They were determined men, 
••• and the worst might have been feared •••• yet the policy of the 
Convention was one of delay; and they might and probably would, if 
there had been occasion, have prot~cted still further any thing 
like open resistance •••• For while the threat of separation is 
clearly expressed in the report, and the existence of separatist 
feeling is recognized in plain terms, the wish for an immediate 
movement in that direction is deprecated and rejected.l 
• Morison, too, defends the Convention's calm but firm handling of the crucial 
situation that it was delegated to confer upon: 
The Report was an attempt both to satisfy enraged New Englan 
and to persuade or frighten the rest of the country into bringing 
the war to a close, and treating New England more justly in the 
future. It is more noteworthy for what it does not, than for what 
it does, recommend •••• [It] was, on the whole, the most temperate 
and statemanlike document that ever issued from a sectional move-
ment in the United States.2 
1 Ibid., 517-518. 
2 IIO'rIson, Life a:nct"'Letters of Harrison Gral otiS, II, 156-159. 
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CHAPTER IV .' 
The Fall of the Federalist Party 
While the Peace of Ghent was received with wild rejoicing in the 
New England states, the post-war concU.tion :e£.;this section of the Union was 
anything but salutary. Whatever vestige or pretense of agriculture New Eng-
land maintained was sadly outclassed by the newly cultivated lands of the 
,.. 
West, and commerce, her mainstay, now faced ruin in the restored intercourse 
with Britain. Her arts of smuggling and piracy had sustained her during the 
war, but peace, however welcomed, brought with it the competition of a pro-
fusion of cheap articles from long established commercial houses of Great 
Britain. Whereas the war had stimulated • Want industries', its end augur 
their ruin, and the next few years saw a migration Dstward of bankrupt New 
Englanders. Politically too, New England was prostrate; as mentioned pre-
viously, the nation as a whole maligned her tor the course she had studious-
..... 
11' followed in opposing the administration in its war policy, and as a con-
sequence New England and its Hartford Convention became the scapegoats of 
the post-war reaction. Connection with the convention or even with Federal-
ism spelled disqualification in national politics, but in state affairs the 
political scene~ at least for the time being, remained unchanged. 
In 1816, the Republicans, surprisingly enough, took steps t.? pro-
tect the infant industries ot the New England states. Lynch, in his book 
Fifty Years of Party Warfare, says, 
The tariff of 1816, while duties were not high, was deliber-
ately framed to give protection to new industries. The Federalist 
party had never become interested in a protective tariff polIcy. 
In the House, the bill was carried by eighty-eight to fift,-four. 
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In the Senate, the bill passed by a vote of twenty-five~o seven. 
Party lines did not hold in either house, but, among those who vot-
ed affirmatively, Republicans far outnumbered Federalists. The re 
sponsibility for this first protective tariff must be placed on 
Republicans as Federalists were too few to carry any measure. l4ad 
ison approved the measure on April 27, 1816.1 
This was one of the means employed by the ktAAblicans to secure the control 
in the Federalist strongholds -- they accused the Federalist leaders of ever 
political crime, and on the side out-federalized Federalism. They were par-
ticularly interested in securing to themselvel the support of the New Englan 
mercantile group: 
The Republican Party started out as a combination of agrarian 
interest groups, but its leaders realized that its permanent safe-
ty required that the mercantile interests be detached from its op-
ponents. To wean away the mercantile interests, the Republicans 
abandoned the principles for which they had stood in 1800, revers-
ing themselves and out-federalizing the Federalists. The purchase 
of Louisiana, the incorporation of the second Bank of the United 
States, and the adoption of a protective tariff following the War 
of 1812, were all evidences of the change in party beliefs. This 
policy succeeded; and after the election of 1816, the Federalist 
Party ceased to be a factor in national politics. Discredited by 
its tactics during the War of 1812 and gradually deprived of the 
support of the mercantile interests, it had no place in the polit1 
cal field and soon died. 2 
The state governments in New England, Delaware, and Maryland were 
predominantly Federalist at the close of the war, and in New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia and North Carolina they held a powerful minority. The zeal-
ous efforts of the Democratic propagandistic campaign managed to discredit 
Federalism in all these states by 1819, with the exception of Massachusetts, 
where Federalists remained at the helm until 1823.3 But the Federalists con 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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and Company, IndianapoliS, 1931, 248. 
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Press Company, New York, 1938, 88. 
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tributed to the weakening of their own ranks by a party schism in 1815. 
This was probably to be expected in view of the situation in whiCh they were 
placed as a result of the Hartford Convention and their attitude toward the 
war; those who could not stand the criticism,of the irate country repudiated 
the convention and the course of their state during the war and hastened to 
ally themselves with the administration; still others refused to back the 
national government in any way, opposing its .ery policy; but the majority 
of the Federalists followed the course of Harrison Gray Otis and attempted 
to restore good feeling in the national family circle, lending support to 
government projects, but actively maintaining their own Federalist tenets in 
local affairs. 
In 1816, then, when the time came for the nomination of a success-
or to liadison, Otis urged the Federalists, to support Yonroe instead of wast-
ing their votes On Rufus King of New York. Though they did not follow his 
suggestion in 1816, by 1820 Otis managed to secure their corroboration or ... 
Monroe's second term. Gore, writing to. King in 1822, mentioned Otis' part 
in influencing the Federalist'vote for the administration: 
••• The Gentleman [otis] , to whom your J.etter alludes, did 
all in his Power to promote the first Election of Mr. Monroe. Al 
though he failed then, at the second choice, he succeeded to in-
sure him a unanimous vote •••• l 
King himself was inclined to agree that the only Federalist course was to 
join forces with the better half of the Republican group; in l4a.y, 1816, he 
wrote to Edward King: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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••• So certain are the Effects of the requisite Arts·of Demo-
cracy, and so effectually prostrate is Federalism, that I have no 
kind of Expectation, that the latter can again be in Favor. 
The course remaining for Federalists, is to adhere to the in-
tegrity of their Principles; and they being out of the question as 
a rival Party, and the Republicans, so soon as this is understood, 
being sure to divide among themselRe.s; the Federalists will be abl 
to assist the true interests of Freedom & of Justice, by giving 
their influence to the least wicked Section of the Republicans. 
Except this service, and it will be a valuable, as well as 
disinterested and honest one, I kno~of none, which federalists 
can render.l . 
Since few seemed inclined to compete with MonDoe for the presiden-
cy, it looked as though the caucus nomination would be practically an elec-
tion. The only other outstanding Republican candidate was William H. Craw-
ford of Georgia who also had a considerable following. When the caucus met 
on ldarch 16th, Clay, realizing the unpopularity of the caucus form of llomina 
tion, moved that it was "inexpedient" to hold such a nomination. This moti 
was defeated, as was another by John Taylor of New York, that caucus nomina-
tions be discontinued. The result of the balloting was sixty-five votes for 
l4onroe as opposed to Crawford's fifty-four. Daniel Tompkins of New York re-
ceived the nomination for vice-president. Lynch describes the Federalists' 
stand in the election: 
While no candidates were officially named by Federalists, it 
C81D9 to be the understanding that Federalist electors should sup-
port King for the presidency. This great man qualified as a'can-
didate to be beaten but he received no notification. No great ef-
fort was made to bring about the selection of Federalist electors, 
but Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware supported King. In 
Rhode Island, still a Feder~list state, no contest took place, and 
l4onroe electors were named. 2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Ibid., 'R. King to Edw. King, May 21, 1816', 537. 
2 William O. Lynch, FiftY' Year§ of Party: Warfare (1789-1831), Indianapolis, 
1931, 251. 
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.' The consensus was that Monroe was as good as elected, so there was little 
or nothing to be gained from fighting him. This was the last time the F ed-
eralists entered a presidential candidate. 
The country as a whole was in fav?r of the nominees, but a storm 
of disapproval was directed against the method of nomination. McKenzie 
describes the situation as follows: 
lteetings were held in JDanY' seo,tions to condemn not so much 
the nominations of the caucus but the system of mominations it-
self. Obviously, the caucus had nearly nominated ,candidates that 
the country could not have accepted, for neither Crawford nor 
Snyder! was generally popular. But it was equally obvious that 
the caucus system was endangering the check and balance system ot 
the federal government by making the presidential candidacy de-
pend upon Congress. Moreover, it was clear that the party was re 
turning to the Virginia-New York combination and to the Virginia 
dynasty, a policy that had been bitterly condemned before and tha 
excluded all but one state from the privilege of furnishing a 
chief magistrate. Had the protesting elements been able to con-
centrate their strength upon one candidate, the campaign might 
have been a more serious·'one. But effective opposition was not 
possible and popular discontent cooled down.2 
The election took place on November 5, 1816, and the votes as 
counted the following February 12th totaled: 
For PreSident, 
James :Monroe, of Virginia 
Rufus King, of New York 
For Vice-President, 
183 
34 
Daniel D. Tompkins, of New York 183 
John E. Howard, of Yaryland 22 
James Ross, of Pennsylvania 5 
John Marshall of Virginia 4 
Robert G. Harper of 1iaryland 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------~--------
1 Governor Simon Snyder of Pennsylvania received thirty votes out of 115 
cast for nomination of the vice-president. 
2 Charles W. McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, New York, 
1938, 89. 
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Nineteen State s voted, and there was no record of the pOPular 
vote. l 
McKenzie comments on the .L<'ederalist action in the election: 
The Federalist electors divided their vice-presidential vote 
among four men, John Howard of llarrland receiving twenty-two vote 
Three Federalist electors in MaryLalld and one in Delaware did not 
attend the Electoral College and so failed to cast their votes. 
The result simply confirmed publically the complete disintegratio 
of the Federalist Party.2 
Whatever bad feelings had lingered Qn after the War of 1812 were 
greatly diminished by a tour of New England which Monroe made in 1817. Oti 
had foraeen the value of such a gesture in consolidating and cementing the 
new-found feeling of nationality that had grown ~ut of the years of peace. 
Christopher Hughes in a letter to Monroe told him of Otis' conviction of th 
good feeling such a tour would produce, and as a consequence Monroe declare 
his intention to visit the New England states. Not since the time of Wash-
ington had a President toured the East, and the citizens awaited the event 
with keen anticipation. Both the Federalists and the llemocrats made lavish 
.... 
preparations. Otis was nominated as the head of a committee to welcome the 
President to Boston, as well as plan for his entertainment during his stay. 
The Democrats, decidedly unwilling to let the Federalists have all the glor 
appointed a similar committee, planning to intercept the President on the 
way and thus frustrate all the elaborate Federalist plans. Otis, however, 
went them one better and met the President's entourage at Providence ~hree 
days before it was expected in Boston, delivering the following greeting, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 1789-1905, 
ed. Thomas Hudson McAee, Friedenwald Company, .washington, 1906, 18. 
2 MMnzie, Party Government in the United States, 90. 
I 
Sir--You are now arrived within the limits of Boston, and ttese 
gentlemen are a Committee appointed to welcome your approach, and 
escort you to your lodgings. Upon your arrival there, they will 
avaU themselves of your permission, to express to you, in a more 
formal and respectful mode, than can be done here, the assurances 
of the Unfeigned satisfaction which the citizens of Boston realize 
in th$ honour you have been pleased to confer upon them by this 
visit. l ~ ~; 
64 
Having disposed of the amenities, the committee fell in with the 
Presidential procession and proceeded to Boston, meeting on the way the rival 
• Democratic receptionists. In the brief diplomatic skirmish which followed, 
the Otis committee won the day because of its official character, and the 
crestfallen Democrats returned home out-smarted. The President proceeded to 
his lodgings, where he was more formally welcomed in a speech which drew 
flattering comparisons between his visit and that of Washington. He replied 
in kind, and throughout his visit received many evidences of Federalist loy-
alty and respect. Morison comments on the good feeling the visit provoked, 
A few days after the President's departure from Boston, the Cen-
tinel made some pleasant comments on his visit under the heading "The 
Era of Good Feelings," a phrase that was later applied to the eight· 
years of Monroe's administration. Modern historians have objected 
to the term as inaccurate. The period of Monroe, they argue, was one 
of bad, not good feelings, because the Republican party was breaking 
up into personal factions. But the mere fact that James Monroe had 
been received with open arms at Boston was sufficient indication that I 
a great change had been wrought in party relations •••• The party press 
apparently had established a truce, except during the month preceed-
ing an election, and even then its tone was calm compared to that of 
war time. 2 
The presidential campaign of 1$20 resolved itself about three issues, 
the Compensation Act which had altered congressmen's salaries from six 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 S. Putnam Waldo, The Tour of James Monroe, President of the United States, 
Hartford, 1818, 128. . 
2 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 209. 
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dollars a day to il,500 a year; internal improvements; and last aIfd most im-
portant, slavery. The question of slavery had arisen with the application 
of Missouri for statepood, and the decision was thereby forced upon Congress 
as to whether or not she might be admitted as a free or a slave state. Of 
. 
;.J. oil; 
course the issue caused a great deal of debate between North and South, re-
su! ting in the famous compromise. lLcKenzie describes the situation and Mon-
roe's reaction to it: 
No other local issue had caused so much passionate oratory, 
so much recrimination, and so much defense. Most of the Northern 
representatives of both old parties united in denying Missouri ad-
mission as a slave state. Most of the Southern members were e-
qually intent on demanding Missouri's admission as a slave state •• 
• • Monroe wisely held aloot from the controversy. Even had he com-
mitted himself to one side or the other there is no likelihood 
that he would have failed of re'lection. The time was too short 
to organize serious opposition to him. As it was, in Pennsylvania 
alone was an electoral ticket in opposition to Monroe nominated, 
a ticket based upo~ the grounds that Monroe was the candidate of 
the slavery party. 
In 1820, then, Monroe was re@lected without opposition; no candidates were 
presented by the Federalists. The situation was oddly unsuited for any or~ 
ganized campaigning: 
The time was not ripe for Clinton, Clay or any other leader 
ambitious to become the chief executive to compete with the Presi-
dent. Crawford, who had given Monroe a close r~ce in the con- I 
gressional caucus of 1816, was content to bide his time in 1820. 
There was no need for Republicans to nominate candidates, but Gen-
eral Samuel Smith issued a call for a congressional caucus. Much 
opposition developed against such a meeting. Only about fifty 
members responded and nothing was done.2 .' 
One electoral vote kept the election from being unanimous. William Plumer 
of New Hampshire, not approving of the tactics of Monroe, felt it his duty 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, 90. 
2 Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 273. 
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c . ' to cast his vote elsewhere, and as a consequence John ~uincy Adams, much to 
his embarrassment, received one electoral vote. 
It is interesting to note in the electoral votes of Massachusetts 
how the two parties, Federalist and Repub1~ca.n, had blended: 
;.J. oil? 
After vacancies ~ the Massachusetts Electoral College1' had 
been filled, it consisted of eight Federalists and seven Repub1i-
cans •••• A11 15 electors voted for Mr. Monroe but divided on the 
Vice Presidency, the 8 Federalist votes going to Mr. Stockton of 
New Jersey •••• The total electoral v~e was 231 for Monroe, 1 for 
John ~uincy Adams; and 218 for Daniel Tompkins for Vice President. 
The other vice-presidential votes were scattered among four men, 
the Federalist votes in Massachusetts going for Stockton.1 
The second term of Monroe saw the Federalists lose control of the 
state governments in the few places where they still had been uppermost. 
Sometimes the Federalists bad it in their power to decide an issue where two 
Republicans were fighting it out, but their weakness was becoming increasing 
1y evident. Only in local elections did they present candidates; in state 
and national affairs their sun had set. 
... 
When it was seen that the Federalists were no longer a JP8nace in 
national affairs, the Republicans, as had been predicted by Rufus King, bick 
ered among themselves. "Personal, group, and sectional interests," comments 
McKenzie, "conflicted and the resulting cliques and factions fought for con-
trol of the party. The Era of Good Feeling produced no new party but it per 
mitted the development of issues that were to bring about a new al1gnm,ent. 1t2 
To return to the State of Massachusetts and Harrison Gray Otis, 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, 91. 
2 !e!g., 91. 
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Boston in 1821 was finally about to receive a charter qualifying h~r to be 
called a city, and Senator Otis was approached with a view to securing his 
consent to the nomination for first Mayor. Since 1784 there bad been five 
occasions on which this change had been urg~, but the people of Boston had 
;p .... 
clung to the Jltown-meeting" form of local government. Upon the recommenda-
tions of a committee of thirteen appointed to study the matter, however, the 
Bostonians agreed by popular vote to alter th, now out-moded system. Otis' 
term as senator from Massachusetts was almost over, and discouraged as he 
was over the unhappy position in which he was placed as a result of the Hart 
ford Convention, he was glad of the opportunity to run for Mayor rather than 
to terminate his career in retirement. Morison, his biographer, is of the 
opinion that Otis had hopes of obtaining the governorship at a future date, 
and that he may have. regarded the mayoralty as a "convenient stepping-stone" 
to that more exalted position. But unfortunately for the much harried Otis, 
there arose in Boston at this time a movement which became known as the 'Mid-
dling Interest'. This faction constituted the "bone and sinew of the party" 
mechanics and shopkeepers who banded together against the Federalist party 
because they felt themselves ignored when political plums in the forms of of- I 
fices or nominations were handed out, because their particular interests werE 
overlooked, and because there existed in Boston a law against wooden build-
18gs over ten feet high within the city limits, which restriction irritated 
them considerably. Otis, noting the tide of opinion even from the distance 
of Washington, ~ote hastily to Sullivan to investigate this faction and try 
to reassure them, but they werealready too late, and the Middling Interest 
proceeded to support Josiah ~uincy for Mayor. This was indeed an embarrass-
68 
ing situation for otis. He had explicitly stated when accepting the nomina-
tion that he wished to compete with no other Federalist who might be put up, 
preterring to withdraw and allow him an Wlcontested field. The Federalists, 
besting ~uincy by five votes (175-170) in the balloting, managed to secure 
. 
;,J. .. ., 
the nomination for Otis, but the Quincy tollowers refused to recognize de-
feat. The vote was so close that the Middling Interest claimed it was not 
binding, while some even went so far. as to de$lare that 'illegal voting' had 
secured the nomination. As a result the Middling Interest acted as a separ-
ate group and nominated the not-unwilling Josiah ~uincy for mayor. Needless 
to say, the Federalists were angry and alarmed by the unexpected develop-
ments, and rather than follow the instruotions of Otis, who as yet knew noth 
ing of this outcome, they g~ded themselves for the battle, and, to quote 
Morison, "there resulted the undignified spectacle of a United States Sena-
tor and a distinguished ex-.ember of Congress competing for a mayoralty.nl 
kins; 
Otis was informed of the strange course of events by Thomas Per-
... 
My dear friend, 
You will probably have been advised trom your son of the 
coune which things have taken here. i.ahti.ncy has thrown himself 
into the hands of the "Jtidling or Medling Interest" and has suffer I 
ed himself to be put up as the Mayor. I had decided upon the 
course it was incumbent on me to pursue and went to the caucus, 
with the intention of making the declaration which I was bound to 
do Wlder your instructions, that is, not to sutter your name to be 
put upon the list of Candidates against anyone of the federal pap. 
ty who might be started for the Mayoralty. This was however done, 
in a manner highly creditable to him, by your son •••• 
Your friends'decided that if upon the canvass you had a majop 
ity of voices you must be supported by the party. You had the 
majority, and you will be voted for on Monday. Harry having made 
---------------------------------------------~------------------------------1 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 239. 
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.' the declaration in your behalf it leaves you at perfect liberty 
to withdraw yourself if you think proper, if elected -- but which 
I hope wlll not be the case. ~cy has done himself up, by the 
course he has pursued. If he gets the Mayoralty', his Olm friends 
will not suffer him to hold his place on the Bench, with which he 
has expressed himself as being partioularly well pleased •••• l 
. 
However, when the votes were coubt~d neither Otis nor ~oy had 
received a majority. Otis seoured 1,384 votes, and Quinoy 1,736; 580 votes 
were scattered. Both candidates were subsequently withdrawn, and John Phil 
• lips, a l"ederalist who suited the Middling Interest, became first mayor of 
Boston by a praotically unanimous vote. 
Within a month Otis resigned his seat in the Senate. This dis-
grace at the polls in his home tOlm humiliated him to suoh a degree that he 
felt he could no longer remain in the more exalted position of senator. 
But he did not retire for very long, because in 1823 the'Federalists were 
looking about for someone to nominate for governor • 
. Massachusetts, the stronghold of Federalism, had been oontinuous-
11' maintaining its perogatives by electing Federalists year after year for 
the position of Governor. The following chart2 indicated the majorities by 
which they secured the elections from the conclusion of the War until the 
downfall of the party: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Ibid., 'Thomas Handasyd Perkins to OtiS, Boston, April 5, 1822', 251-
252. 
2 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 240. (Figures up 
to 1820 include Maine.) 
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Year Federalist Republican 
1815 Streng 50,921 Dexter 43,938 
1816 Brooks 49,578 Dearborn 47,384 
1817 II 46,160 .. 38,129 
1818 
" 39,538 . Crowninshie1d 30,041 ;.J. oil; 1819 II 42,875 It 35,271 
1820 " 31,072 Eustis 21,928 1821 
" 28,608 
If 20,268 
1822 It 28,487 n 21,177 
1823 otis 30,171 'I 34,402 
1824 Lathrop 34,210 • n 38,650 
Brooks would probably have been elected indefinitely had he chose 
to run and lived long enough, but in 1822 he reached the age of seventy, an 
decided to retire. otis, who once before had declined nomination for the 
governorship now mentioned the wish to be again approached. The desire to 
erase his previous defeat in the elections for mayor prompted Otis to try 
for the higher office. The Federalists were only too glad to gratify him, 
in spite of the fact that his losing the mayoralty of Boston might indicate 
a turn in the tide of Federalism. as personified by him. In opposition to 
Otis the Republicans nominated the thrice-defeated Dr. William Eustis, a 
man who had had a distinguished career as Secretary of War under lIadison, 
lLinister to Holland after the War of 1812, and besides had the added dis-
tinction of having fought in the Revolutionary War. Naturally, the f~rst 
thing the Republicans did was to vilify the much beleaguered past of poor 
etis. On this point Morison states, 
otis proved to be a vulnerable candidate. He was weal thy, 
at a time when lIass8chusetts was already sufficiently democratic 
to look on that fact as disqualification for office; he had voted 
for Burr in 1801; he was a proprietor of the Charles R~ver Bridge; 
I 
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.' he had argued against free primary schools. The Boston Statesman 
appealed to tbe orthodox clergy for influence. and votes on the 
ground that Otis was a Unitarian, "addicted to habitual profane 
swearing, It am because be was "one of the corporation of Harvard 
University, which is well known to be devoted to the propagation 
of a particular creed, and to have exerted an Ulidue and highly 
prejudicial influence to deprees,Q}.her literary institutions, and 
other denominations of Christians.· He had invited John Henry, 
the British spy, so it was reported, to dine at his house. He 
had voted on both sides of the Kissouri question, and his vote 
against the Tariff Bill of 1820 sbowed that he was no friend to 
domestic manufacture. And most heinous of all, he was a leader 
of the treasonable Hartford Conven~onll 
So it happened that even in his own state Otis was to hear charges that the 
convention which met in her defense was a treasonable and disgraceful mark 
on her record, as well as personal dishonor to himself. ~rison continues, 
The term Hartford Convention had no such terrors for the 
people of Massachusetts as it had for the rest of the Union. 
They knew its history too well to believe the absurd charges 
brought up against it, and they had kept the party responsible 
for it in power for eight years. But they were unwilling to vote 
for a candidate simply to vindicate it •••• The Centinel opened the 
campaign, on February 19, with a series of questions and answers 
on the Hartford ~onvention; the Federalist Central ~ommittee is-
sued a pamphlet justifying it (Lyman's Short Account); and the-
Federalist press overflowed with apologetic literature.2 
Otis I supporters wasted too much time vindicating the Hartford 
Convention before the people who had supported it, and the opposition so 
successfully tore down Otis' career that the belated reminders of his pa-
triotiSJll, how long and hard he had labored as Senator to secure the Massa-
chusetts war Claims, as well as counter-attacks on Eustis, had no avail. 
Eustis was elected governor with over 4,000 votes to spare, and Otis, co~ 
pletely crushed, went into retirement. 
-----------------------------------------~---------------------------------
1 Ibid., 241-242. 
2 Ibid., 242-243. 
I' 
72 
. He [Eustis 1 carried not only every county that had ~ver gone 
Democratic, but even hide-bound .Essex and Hampden, which thereby 
repudiated Federalism for the first time since the original divi-
sion of parties. l 
The victory of Eustis lost their last state to the Federalist par-
ty, which then entered into a "period of finwl dissolution". Eustis added 
insult to injury, when, in his inaugural address, he gave a bitter criticiam 
of the war policy of the Federalists. Though Otis was requested to run for 
.. 
governor in 1824, he refused, contenting himself with publishing h~s "Let-
ters in Defense of the Hartford Convention and the People of Massachusett8~ 
before the election, with appropriate remarks on the tactics of Governor 
Eustis. After ,1824 the Massachusetts Federalists were unable to present 
more candidates for governor. 
The use of the congressional caucus system was once more attempted 
for the nominations in the presidential campaign of 1824. Sixty-six members 
of Congress, out of a total of 261, presented themselves on February 14,. 
1824, to take part in the nominations; their selections, on the Republican 
ticket, were William H. Crawford of Ueorgia for President, and Albert Galla-
tin for Vice-President. To their resolution that these two men be nominate 
as the national candidates, they appended this explanation: 
In making the foregoing recommendation, the members of this 
meeting have acted in their individual characters as citizens; 
that they have been induced to this measure from a deep and set-
tled conviction of the importance of the union among liepublicans 
throughout the United States, and as the best means of collecting 
and concentrating the feelings and wishes of the people of the 
Union upon this important subject. 2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Ibid., 243. 
2 Thomas Hudson McKee, National Conv!ptions and Platforms of all Political 
Parties, 1789-1905, Washington, 1906, 20. 
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Gallatin was chosen to run with Crawford in the hope of strengthelling Craw-
ford t s chances by thus enlisting the support of Pennsylvania. Unfortunate-
ly for their plans, the question of Gallatin's citizenship was brought up; 
he had lived in the country since 1780, but. it was held that he had not beel! 
... 
in residence when the Constitution was adopted. Gallatin was therefore co~ 
pelled to defend himself against this charge throughout the initial cam-
paign, and in the following October he withdr--Iw entirely from the ticket. 
In any case his ohances were slight, as Calhoun, who had withdrawn hi. name 
from the list of presidential candidates, had been jointly selected by the 
'anti-caucus' group for the vice-presidency. The caucus itself was a fa11-
ure since there eXisted at the time no outstanding parties, and the presi~ 
dential campaign became instead a ttpersonal contest ll in which Henry Clay 
of Kentucky, J ohn..Nincy Adams of Massachusetts, William H. Crawford of 
Georgia, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, fought for supremacy. 
To add to the general excitement, it was evident that a majority 
.... 
would not be polled for any one of these candidates, and that the final 
election would rest with the House of Representatives, to which group only 
three of the names could be presented. The ,,'ederalist position in the cam-
paign was embarrassing: 
With their national organization gone and their state machine 
rapidly disintegrating, individual Federalists had either to sup-
port their fellow citizens, John Quincy Adams, for the pre!ddency 
in the fall of 1824, or.haveno party at all •••• Those who were in-
terested in the new manufactures of Massachusetts could overlook 
his personal antagonisms and appreciate hi. national position, hi~ 
agreement with Henry Clay on an "American System" of internal im-
provements and high tariffs. They were materially interested in 
high tariffs. On that account, they could endure the association 
with Adams. 
I 
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Other Federalists, however, could not join with A~. Theo-
dore Lyman, Jr., whose father had been intimately associated with 
the ~8sex Junto, was a ~ederalist member of the state legislature. 
Francis Baylies,of Taunton, Congressman for the Bristol district, 
had beenidentified with the Hartford Convention movement. Such 
Federalists as these turned away from their former associate., who 
were now leaning toward the "national" or conservative wing of the 
Republican party, and drew closer ... t..;, those Republicans who objecte 
to Adams •••• Everything political was in a welter of uncertainty. 
No one knew how new party lines would eventually be drawn. Promin 
ent individuals, however, began to associate together in oppositio 
to their fellow citizen, Adams.l . 
.. 
Adams was anything but popular as an individual; his demeanor was 
cold and not conducive to earning friends. ~esides the conservative ~'ederal 
ist opposition, there also confronted him that of the "old lf Republicans who 
favored ~rawford. These, adhering to the strict construction policy of the 
old Jeffersonian Democracy, were opposed to high tariffs and internal 1m-
provements; and the southern members of this faction were further alienated 
from Adams because he had opposed slavery at the time of the Missouri Co~ 
promise. 
... 
Nevertheless, Adams carried bis own state by an overwhelming major 
ity. Crawford upset the hmpes of his faction by becoming too ill to partici 
pate in the election, and, as Darling says, "the issue became simply a ques-
tion of Adams' popularity with his fellow citizens. 1t He continues, 
Scareely one-hal.! of those [citizens of MassaChusetts] who ha 
voted to the Spring election for governor cast their ballots for 
presidential electors in November. If those who stayed awaY.,fava 
ed someone else over Adams they did not care enough to go to the 
polls. Massachusetts appeared to have abandoned paritisan divi-
sions for the moment to acclaim its illustrious 80n. 2 
----------------------------------------------------------i:--A;~h~;-B~-D~ling, Political CbMges in !assachusetts, 1824-1848, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1925, 41-42. 
2 Ibid., 45. 
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The elections took place on November 2, 1824, with twenlr","four 
states voting. In six states, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, 
South Carolina and Vermont, the legislature still held the authority to 
choose the electors; but in the oth~r state~ a popular vote was taken, and 
the results of this vote are the first recorded for a presidential election 
Andrew Jackson, Democrat, 
John ~uincy Adams, Coalition, 
William H. Crawford, Democrat, 
Henry Clay, Republican, 
Total, 
155,872 
105,321 
44,282 
46,587 
352,062 
The electoral vote, as counted on February 9, 1825, gave a roajority to no 
candidate, and the three names submitted to the House were Andrew Jackson, 
who had received 99 electoral votes; John ...nuncy Adams, 84 votes; and V{il-
lam H. Crawford, 41 votes. Clay lost mention before the House by only fiv 
votes. John Calhoun received the vice-presi4ency by a majority of 182 vote 
with his nearest competitor, Nathan Sanford of New York, receiving only 30 • 
... 
McKee describes the House election: 
Accordingly, the same day, February 9, 1825, the Senate h~v­
ing retired, the House immediately proceeded to elect a President 
A roll-call showed that ever2 member of the House except Mr. Gar-nett, of Virginia, (who was) sick at his lodgings in Washington, I 
was present. Mr. Webster, of Massachusetts, and ~r. Randolph, of 
Virginia, were appointed tellers. The House conducted the elec-
tion according to the rules already adopted, and on the first bal 
lot John Quincy Adams was chosen. The votes of thirteen states 
were given to him, those of seven to Jackson, and of four t,o Craw 
ford. The Speaker declared Mr~ Adams elected, and notice of the 
result was sent to the Senate.~ 
----------------------~-~----------------~-----------------------------1 McKee, National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 21. 
2. Defect in the type of MUS. 
3 Ibid., 22-23. 
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The following table, (Page 77), which indicates the votes of the ~tates, is 
especially interesting in view of the charge of a 'dealt between Clay and 
Adams. The accusation was that Clay, defeated in the electoral vote by a 
small margin, had it well in his power to t~ the election by giving his 
support to the candidate of his choice, and that knowing this, he l;tad sup-
ported Adams to his own personal gain. Clay was approached by members of 
all three factions, but finally chose to side;.with Adams, and though the 
House, after careful investigation, found no evidenoe of a deal, yet the ac-
cusation was strengthened by Adams' appointment of Clay to the position of 
Secretary of State. 
The possibility of collusion between Adams and Clay, however cir-
cumstantial, yet supplied the opposition with an abundance of fuel for the 
next campaign. Jackson himself stated three years later that a Congressman 
of Clay's fae tion had told him of the arrangement, offering him Clay's sup-
port on the same terms. Mch.enzie gives an interesting analysis of the si~ 
ation: 
A comparison of the votes in the Electoral College with those 
in the House of hepresentatives shows some interesting facts. 
Where Adams had carried only the electoral votes of New England I 
and divided those of New York, Delaware, Maryland, LouiSiana, and 
Illinois, he obtained the three Clay States of Kentucky, Missouri 
and Ohio, and the Jackson States of Maryland and Louisiana in the 
House vote. And unquestionably the Clay influence gave him the 
vote of l~ew York. Where Crawford had carried the electoral vote 
of only two States, Georgia and Virginia, and had divided the 
votes of Delaware, l4aryland, and New York, he kept Georgia and 
Virginia in the House, carried Delaware clearly, and won North 
Carolina away from Jackson. Where Jackson had had a plurality in 
the electoral vote, he now was in second place in the House vote, 
with Adams, second in the Electoral College, elected President. 
It looked like a deal. And because it looked like a deal Adams 
was doomed to defeat four years later, for Jackson's friends were 
aroused. The new democracy of the West was to speak in protest 
J. Q. Andw. Wm. H. STATES Adams Jackson Crawford 
Alabama 3 
Connecticut 6 
Delaware 1 
Georgia ;p '""? 7 
Illinois 1 
Indiana 3 
Kentucky 8 4 
Louisiana 2 1 
Maine 7 
'" Maryland 5 3 1 
Massachusetts 12 1 
Mississippi 1 
Missouri 1 
New Hampshire 6 
t • New Jersey 1 5 
New York 18 2 14 
North Carolina 1 2 10 
Ohio 10, 2 2 
Pennsylvania 1 25 
Rhode Island 2 
South Carolina 9 
Tennessee 9 
Vermont 5 
Virginia 1 1 12 
Total 87 71 54 
During this period Congress was politically divided as follows: l 
Nineteenth Congress 
Senate -~ 38 Democrats, 10 Whigs - - - - - - - - - - Total, 48 
House - 79 Federalists, 134 ,Democrats - - -' - - - " , 213 ,-
Twentieth Congress 
Senate -- 37 Democrats, 11 Whigs - - - - - - - - - - Total, 48 
House -:- 85 Federalists, 128 Democrats - - - - - - " , 213 
1 Ibid., 23-24. 
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against East~rn domination and deals. It began speaking as soon 
as the House vote was announced; it continued to speak tor many 
years after ~dams was deteated tor re8lection and Jackson had as-
sumed the Pr.esidency.l . 
Thu~, trom tlbe moment Adams received the presidency in 1825, the 
bitter campaign ot 1828 was launched to obt.aj,n his downfall. nNo story, It 
says McKenzie, Itwas too preposterous if it could make votes against Adams." 
Jackson was immediatellF nominated tor the presidency (October, 1825) by the 
• legislature ot Tennessege; this action was prompted by Jackson's declaration 
that he was in tavor o~ a constitutional amendment which would place the 
election ot the preside.nt directly into the hands ot the people. According-
ly, Jackson resigned hLs seat in the Senate and the campaign began in "&m-
est, with the avowed ~pose to avenge the hero of New Orleans for what his 
supporters considered a.::n unfair defeat at the hands of Adams. 
Adams was at .A disadvantage from the first. He had difficulty in 
reassuring the differen-t factions which had supported him, b~sides the added 
obstacle of the barrage of propaganda hurled at him from the moment that lie 
stepped into office. L:=rnch describes his predicament: 
Adams ne~ded and received the aid of certain Federalists in 
the House whe~ chosen President, but it is doubtful whether the 
Federalist co~tingent in the Adams party proved to be an asset or 
a liability. It is certain that Adams wished his Administration 
to be regardec:i as Republican. He had assured Webster and ~art!eld 
that he would not proscribe Federalists should he become President 
but he had no intention ot giving prominence to the members of the 
party from whLch he had sf'parated in 1808 •••• The Federalist's of 
New Hampshire were anxious to support the Administrati~n but they 
found the Pre .. ident to be cold and unresponsive. The Republicans 
of that state who joined the Adams party, including Governor John 
Bell, feared t-he effects of an alliance with the Federalists. 
Each section 0--£ the party ot Jefferson wished to retain the char-
acter and nam .. of the Republican party. Webster sadly told Adams, 
-----------------------~-------------~----------------------------------~--1 ~cKenzie, Party Gover=?Qment in the United States, 96-97. 
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that "each kept up the same tone of hostility toward the 4federal-
ists as in the days when there was a Federal Party.l 
In 1828, then, the political parties took on a definite character 
which was to identify them throughout several subsequent presidential elec-
tions. The Democrats nominated Andrew Jackso.for President and John Cal-
houn for Vice-President;. the National Republican Party (later the Whig Pap-
ty) supported John ~uincy Adams for re81ection, and Richard Rush of Penneyl 
vania for vice-president. Lynch regards this ~hQioe of Rush as a definite 
mistake on the part of the Adams faction, since the prospective southern 
vote was thus alienated by the nomination of two men from non-slaveholding 
states: 
It is true that both Jackson and Calhoun were from the South 
bu~ each had a large degree of popularity in the North while the 
same cannot be asserted ~f either Adams or Rush in regard to the 
South. Of the western states wl1.ofe House delegations helped to 
make Adams President in 1825, evety one chose Jackson electors in 
1828. Not even Kentucky, Clay's own state, stood by the Adminis-
tration. 2 
The Federalists and the Hartford Convention were again berated 
abused in this campaign of 1828. Both sides decried affiliation with them, 
and both sides likewise accused the other of alliance, secret or otherwise, 
with the traitors. 
The Federalists played in this contest the unhappy role of 
scapegoats, the ownership of which each side attempted to force 
upon the other. The Boston Statesmen, a typical blackguarding 
Jackson sheet, supported by the hungry office-seeking element in 
the Democratic party, attempted to prove that John ~cy Adams 
was a Hartford Convention Federalist in disguise, and that his 
candidacy was a Federalist plot to revive the "reign of terror" 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 352-353. 
2 Ibid., 355. 
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.' of the elder Adams. During the month before election day its 
pages became fairly spotted with "Hartford Convention" in italics 
and capitals. At the same time the Statesman had for,its only 
ally in the Boston press the Jackson Republican, which was found-
ed and edited by Theodore Lyman, ,Jr., a great-nephew of Timothy 
Pickering, and author of the Sbott Account of the Hartford Ccmven 
tion •••• lt is needless to saythat.in its pages all references to 
the Hartford Convention are carefUliy avoided. The conservative 
Adams press in Boston, remembering its past, was also tender of 
old Federalist issues until a week before the election, when the 
President forced its hand. On October 29 he published in the ~­
tional Intelligencer, in reply to certain imputations against his 
motives for deserting Federalism, tHat in 1808 the object of 
l4assachusetts Federalist leaders "was , and had been for several 
years a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a sep-
arate confederation. It Boston was still gasping for breath over 
this startling announcement when it learned that Daniel Webster, 
one of .il.dams' most eminent supporters, was about to bring a libel 
suit against Theodore Lyman for casually mentioning him in the 
Jackson Republican as one of the former Federalist leaders whom 
the President intended to impugn. 
A more complicated political situation it would be difficult 
to imagine. One Jackson paper was accusing Adams of Federalism; 
Adams was charging the Federalists with treason, and an Adams 
Federalist was suing,a Jackson Federalist for implying that he 
was among the traitors.l 
This unexpected action on the part of Adams 'so aroused the Feder. 
alists of MassaChusetts that they withdrew their support from his party and 
nominated instead their own ticket, naming otis and Prescott as their 
choice. This resulted in a meager response of 156 votes which were secured I 
only in Boston. In spite of his last minute charge, Adams obtained the 
majority vote in his state, only to lose to Jackson in the final accounting 
" 
The election took place on November 4, 1828, with twenty-four 
states voting; only in South Carolina were the electors selected by the 
legislature. The popular vote accorded to Jackson 647,2)1 votes, as oppo~ 
to Adams' 509,097. Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray otis, II, 247-248. 
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New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont gave their full quota of electoral 
votes to Adams and Rush; while liaine, Maryland, and New York were divided. 
Jackson received 178 electoral votes in all; Adams, 83. Calhoun took the 
vice-presidency with 171 electoral vote~j.as opposed to Rush's 83, Georgia 
.~ 
having delegated seven votes for this office to William Smith of South Ca 
lina. 
During this period Congress was ~olitically divided as follows: l 
Twenty-First Congress 
Senate -- 38 Democrats, 10 Whigs - - - - - - - - Total, 48 
House -- 142 Democrats, 71 Vihigs - - - - - - - - " , 213 
Twenty-Second Congress 
Senate -- 35 Democrats, 13 "Mihigs - - - - - - - - Total, 48 
House - 130 Democrats, 83 rlhigs - - - - - - - - " , 213 
Thus, with the elimination of the ,It'ederUists in the twenty-first 
Congress, the once illustrious party lost every vestige of organization and 
". became a legend, to be recalled when derogatory material was needed in e-
lection campaigning. The Federal Party had lost control of state affairs 
in 1825; in local interests it had held on until,its extinction in 1827. 
But the eleventh hour ticket of presidential electors in 1828, headed by 
Otis, was, as Morison affirms, "the last ticket ever voted for that bore 
the name of the once powerful party of Washington and Hamilton."2 ~he Hart 
ford Convention, called to rescue the New ~gland states from national op-
pression, had resulted instead in the ruin and condemnation of the outstand 
ing and powerful party which controlled their affairs. Not even the grad-
ual. blending of the Federalists into the parties of the day saved them from 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 McKee, National Conventions and Platform§ gf All Political Parties, 26. 
2 llerison, Life and Letters of Harr'so , II, 248. 
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occasional blasts of criticism for their supposed treason in 18t5. Their 
existence was thus commemorated, however negatively, for some years, and 
the National Republican (Whig) Party which t,hey had joined during Adams' 
administration, received liberal and repea~ed attacks for harboring 'Hart-
ford Convention Federalists.' 
Even in 1942, one hundred and twelJ,ty-seven years later, the cry 
"Hartford I,;onvention" still rings in Easte~ ears. Rebuked by Major Karl 
Detzer of the office of the undersecretary 01 war, for their hysterical 
fears that Chicago was half-heartedly supporting World War II, an editorial 
from the maligned city retorted: 
Maj. Detzer should tell the people of the east that in the 
west there never was anything res~bling a Hartford convention to 
consider secession of the eastern _tates from the Union, at the 
very time the nation was fighting .,he War of 1812.1 
---------------------------------------------'------------------------------
1 Chicago Sunday Tribune, "The Slave of the Lamp", May 31, 1942, I, 10 •. Mo 
I 
83 
.' CRITICAL ESSAY au AUTHORITIES 
l--SOURCE MATERIAL. 
Valuable comments on conditions in New 4tgland before and during the war, 
and the Eastern reaction to them were secured from such accounts as that 
of A New England Farmer, (John Lowell),.Per~tual War, the Policy of Mr. 
Madison, Boston, 1812; Solomon Aiken' rTite lse and Progress of Political 
Dissention in the United States, a Sermon, Preached in Dracutt, May 11, 
1811, It Being the Annual Fast, Haverhill, 1811; John Lathrop's The Pre-
sent War Unexpected, Unnecessarz, and Ruinous, Boston, 1812. The opin-
ions of the minority in the HOuse of Representatives on the vote for a 
declaration of war against England, were4Pbtained from the pamphlet pub-
lished by this group, entitled ~ Address of Members of the House of Rep-
resentatives of the Congress of the United States, to their donstituents, 
on the SUbject of the ~ar with Great Britain, BOston, 1812. 
The ~glish opinion of Jefferson's Embargo and its effects upon Great 
Britain was secured from a very interesting and satirical report of the 
British spy, John Howe, edited b,. the ~erican HistoticM Review, XVII, 
llacl4illan Oompany, London, 1912. The Olive Branch; 2,£, Faults on Both 
Sides, Philadelphia, 1815, written by M. Carey during the war, was an in-
teresting attempt to bring about harmony between Federalists and Repub-
licans b,. showing the failings of each. The reception of the news in Bo 
ton of the capture of Washington became the subject of accusations a-
gainst the Whig part,. in the Harrison campaign (1840), and the account of 
the incident which had been published by the National AEgis was quoted in 
the Boston Morning Post, Extra, ~ugust, 1840. _ 
.. 
Material on the lieport of the Hartford Convention was obtained from the 
official publication of the Convention, The Proceedings of a Convention 
of Delegates from the States of Massachusetts, COnnecticut, and Rhode 1s-
~; the Counties of Cheshire and Grafton in the State of New Hampshire; 
and the County of Windham in the State of Vermont; Convened at 1i&rtford 
in the state of COnnecticut, December 15, 1814, Hartford, 1815. The "Re-
port of the Hartford COnvention", as contained in American Historl Leaf-
lets, edited b,. Albert Bushnell Hart and .b;Qward Channing, New York, 1906, 
was also helpful. James Monroe's tour of the New England States, narrat-
ed b,. one of his travelling companions, contained the various greetings 
and speeches made en route: S. Putnam Waldo, The Tour of James Monroe, 
President of the United States, Hartford, 1818. 
The first publication of the secret journal was contained in Letters De-
ve 0 the C acte d Views f he H ve . , by One of 
the Convention, Harrison Gra,. Otis, Washington, 1820. Theodore Lyman, 
writing in defense of the Convention, also included a copy of the journal 
in his A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, Taken from Official 
Documents and Addressed to the Fair Minded and Well DisPQsed to Which is 
- ~ Added an ~ttested COPY of the Secret Journal of That Body, Boston, 1823. 
Theodore Dwight's History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, is 
especially valuable for its quotations from state records and prominent 
individuals'involved in the controversy. William Sullivan's Familiar 
Letters on Public Characters and Public Events, Boston, 1834, contains 
pertinent studies of the period. Charges of treason against the Hartfor 
Convention instigated by John ~uincy Adams are found in their original 
form in Correspondence Between John ~uiftOt Adams, Esquire President of 
the United S~ates, and Several CitiBens of Massachusetts ~oncerning the 
Charge of a Design to Dissolve the nion Alleged to Have Existed in that 
State, Bo~ton, 1829; Documents Relating to New England Federalism, edited 
by Henry Adams, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston,' 1877, contains the 
aforementioned documents as well as a quaniity of other pertinent mater-
ial. 
2--BIOGRAPHY. 
A biography especially helpful to a knowledge of this period, was Samuel 
Eliot Morison's Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, ~ 
1848, I, II, Houghton llifflin and Company, Boston, 1913, since it con-
tained not only the life of this important leader of the Convention, but 
also many. documents related to the period. The Life and CorresOSndence 
of Rufus ~ing, V, VI, edited by Charles R. King, G. P. Putnam's ons, New 
York, 1898, was liberally supplied with source material. The Life and 
Letters of George Cabot, by Henry Cabot Lodge, Little, Brown, and Co~ 
pany, BOston, 1878, gave an interesting and reliable account of the views 
of the President of the Convention. 
3--COLLEC'i'ED CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES. 
TheWritin~s of Albert Gallatin, I, III, edited by Henry Adams, J. B .... 
Lippencott& Company, Philadelphia, 1879, supplied the necessary informa-
tion concerning the financial status of the country before and during the 
war. The Works of Henra Clay Comprising His Life, Correspondence and Speeches, I, edited by alvin Colton, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 190 
supplied material for the discussion of Clay's decision to support John 
~uincy Adams for the presidency in 1824. I 
4--SECONDARY MATERIAL. 
Henry Adams' History of the United States of America, VI, VII, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1890, was ,particularly valuable for its foot-
notes, as well as quoted documentary evidence on the aid given to .,England 
by the Eastern States during the war. Thomas Hudson McKee's National 
Conventions and Platforms of AU Political Parties, 1789-1905, Frieden-
wald Company, supplied a statistical record of the voting in the various 
elections. Specialized studies of party development of exceptional qual-
ity were William O. Lynch's Fifty Years ot Party Warfare (1789-1837), 
Bobbs.;J4errill Company, Indianapolis, 1931; Charles Vi. l4cKenzie' s Party 
Government in the United States, Ronald Press Company, New York, 1938; 
and Arthur B. Darling's Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824-1848, 
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Yale University Press, New ~aven, 1925. Kendric Charles Babco~k's !nl 
Rise of American Nationality, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1906, provide 
valuable footnotes and background reading. The Northern Confederacy Ac-
cording to the Plans of the "Essex Junto", 1796-1814, by Charles Raymond 
Brown, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1915, also provided help-
notations. 
I 
